The privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion often evokes thoughts of physical intrusion as well as electronic or mechanical intrusion such as video surveillance or telephone recording, which is closely tied to the larger framework of invasion of privacy tort elements and defenses. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B defines intrusion upon seclusion as “one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” In Minnesota, the tort has three elements: “(a) an intrusion; (b) that is highly offensive; and (c) into some matter in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life Insurance Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
An intrusion
The first element is an intrusion. The Restatement definition quoted above reaches a person who “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,” so the intrusion must be intentional. In the employment context, this maps to the limits described in recording employees at work under Minnesota law and in workplace monitoring policies under Minnesota law.
Highly offensive to a reasonable person
The intrusion upon someone’s seclusion must be substantial to give rise to an intrusion upon seclusion claim, and successful plaintiffs may pursue damages for invasion of privacy under Minnesota law. The offensiveness of the intrusion must be great and the factors that the court looks to in considering the degree of the intrusion are: context, conduct, and circumstances surrounding the intrusion. The court will also look to the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. In Minnesota, there must be a degree of repugnance in order to have a successful intrusion upon seclusion claim. Fabio v. Credit Bureau of Hutchinson, Inc., 210 F.R.D 688 (D. Minn. 2002).
Reasonable expectation of privacy of the matter
Any individual bringing forth an intrusion upon seclusion claim must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, the Eighth Circuit found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the existence of a child support order that the plaintiff admitted was public information. Phillips v. Grendahl, 312 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 2002). Minnesota courts have not fully explained or defined reasonable expectation of privacy, but in Swarthout the Court of Appeals compared an insurer’s altered medical release to the Restatement’s illustration of a forged court order used to obtain bank records. Related contexts are covered in employee break room surveillance laws and in invasion of privacy in the workplace.
Defenses
There are a number of defenses to an intrusion upon seclusion claim including public property, consent, common custom, and waiver. A claim brought too late also fails; see statutory deadlines for business tort claims in Minnesota. If an intrusion was done on public property then it is unlikely that a claim of invasion of privacy will be successful. If a plaintiff voluntarily provides private information, or provides consent, then that is a defense to an intrusion upon seclusion.
If an intrusion is deemed to be customary or common usage then it does not rise to the level of intrusion upon seclusion. In the case Florida Pub. Co. v. Fletcher, a reporter took a photograph of a fire victim per the orders of the fire marshal who had run out of film. The Florida Supreme Court decided that there was no invasion of privacy because it is customary for reporters to be alongside public officials at disasters. 340 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1976). For limits on a landlord’s entry into a tenant’s home, see what a landlord cannot do.
Lastly, any waiver of the right to have your privacy protected will defeat an intrusion upon seclusion claim. For how waiver works with contract rights, see waiver of a contractual right. The definition of a waiver is a “voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. County of Hennepin, 450 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1990).