If a co-founder wrote your company’s code and never signed an assignment, the founder owns the copyright unless a work-made-for-hire rule makes the company the owner. One rule covers code the founder wrote as the company’s employee within the scope of that employment. The other covers listed kinds of commissioned work when the founder and the company signed a written agreement that it is a work made for hire. If others wrote the code with the founder as a joint work, the founder co-owns it with them. The company may still hold a license to keep using code the founder delivered, and a confirmatory assignment the founder signs now can repair the record. The gap matters when the company raises money or is sold, because a license leaves the founder holding the rest of the rights.
The Copyright Act’s authorship, work-for-hire, and transfer rules set the default for who owns code. The decisions below are federal: Kirk v. Harter comes from the Eighth Circuit, the circuit that includes Minnesota, and decisions from other circuits are persuasive authority here. Minnesota law enters through the corporation and LLC statutes when a founder received equity in exchange for the code. This page is written for founders and owners on either side of ownership disputes over code, a brand, or other IP one founder created.
What Decides Who Owns Code a Co-Founder Wrote?
The founder who wrote the code owns its copyright unless the company owns it through one of three routes. The founder wrote it as the company’s employee within the scope of employment, absent a signed writing in which the founder and the company expressly agreed otherwise. The founder signed a writing that transferred it. Or, for listed kinds of commissioned work, the founder and the company signed a written agreement that it is a work made for hire. A joint author co-owns it with the other authors. Copyright starts with the author: “Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work” (17 U.S.C. § 201(a)).
The employee route is the work-made-for-hire rule. A work made for hire includes “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” (17 U.S.C. § 101). For that work, under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), “the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” A founder who was never an employee can make code a work made for hire only through a second clause of 17 U.S.C. § 101. That clause applies to listed kinds of commissioned work and only “if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” The Seventh Circuit held that this writing must be “signed by both” and “must precede the creation of the property” (Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992)). The Second Circuit concluded that “the 1976 Act requires that the parties agree before the creation of the work that it will be a work made for hire,” but assumed the writing could come later “if the writing confirms a prior agreement, either explicit or implicit, made before the creation of the work” (Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995)). Both are persuasive authority in Minnesota. For code that already exists, I suggest the confirmatory assignment described below rather than a work-for-hire agreement, because both courts required an agreement made before the work was created.
The transfer route needs a signed writing. Under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a), “A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” A spoken promise that the code belongs to the company does not meet that rule on its own, though it can matter later as evidence of an earlier transfer that a signed writing confirms. The general defaults for code, inventions, and brands are summarized in who owns intellectual property.
When Is a Co-Founder the Company’s Employee Under the Copyright Act?
A co-founder is the company’s employee for copyright purposes when the general common law of agency says so. The Supreme Court held that courts decide this question under agency law, and that they “consider the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished” (Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The other factors include the skill required, the source of the tools, the location of the work, the duration of the relationship, the method of payment, employee benefits, and tax treatment. The Court added: “No one of these factors is determinative.” It cited the Restatement of Agency as “setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee.”
The Eighth Circuit, whose states under 28 U.S.C. § 41 are “Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota,” applied that test in Kirk v. Harter, 188 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1999). A programmer had written software for a business over six years with no written agreement. The business reported his pay on Form 1099, withheld no taxes, and provided no benefits, and he consulted for other companies and once hired a subcontractor. The court held that “the evidence compels a determination that Harter was in fact an independent contractor and not an employee, with the result that he was the owner of the computer program and thus not liable for copyright infringement.” It reached that result although he spent significant time in the business’s offices, used its equipment, and worked its trade-show booth.
The Ninth Circuit later cited Kirk and warned: “There is a danger, however, in relying on them too heavily, because they do not bear directly on the substance of the employment relationship,” referring to tax and benefits factors. In JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010), a shareholder and director took over writing a start-up’s source code with no written employment agreement. The court reasoned that “Byce was paid a regular monthly salary in the same way as other JustMed employees. This weighs heavily in favor of finding him an employee, even though much of the salary came in the form of stock.” It also weighed his title: “his formal title indicates that he had broad duties within JustMed, as well as a relationship with the company that was intended to be permanent.” It held that he was an employee and that the company owned the code as a work made for hire, because a start-up’s informality “should not make the company more susceptible to losing control over software integral to its product.”
In your dispute, the facts that decide employee status include how the founder was paid and how the company reported the pay. They also include whether the founder worked for others and whether the work was open-ended or one project. The code must also fall within the scope of employment. The work-for-hire and IP assignment rules for Minnesota businesses cover the scope question and the commissioned-work clause.
When Does Founder Code Become a Joint Work?
Founder code becomes a joint work when two or more authors wrote it intending their parts to merge into one program, and each author then co-owns the whole copyright. Under 17 U.S.C. § 101, “A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” Under 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), “The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.” Supplying the idea does not make a founder an author: under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” The Second Circuit, persuasive authority in Minnesota, applied its earlier test that “A co-authorship claimant bears the burden of establishing that each of the putative co-authors (1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors” (Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Joint authorship can remain after a loss on the employee question. In Reid, the Supreme Court agreed that the sculptor was an independent contractor. It then noted that the organization that hired him might still be a joint author if the trial court found the intention § 101 describes. In that case, the Court said, the two “would be co-owners of the copyright in the work.” The Court did not decide that question. In the Second Circuit, that claim would also need the independently copyrightable contribution Thomson describes.
When the other contributor was the company’s employee, § 201(b) treats the company as that author, so the company and a founder who never assigned can end up as co-owners of one program. If they do, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996), persuasive authority in Minnesota, means neither can sue the other for infringing it: “an owner does not have rights exclusive of a co-owner’s, so an infringement claim cannot lie against a co-owner.” Citing an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, the court said a co-owner’s “duty to account to other co-owners for profits arises from equitable doctrines relating unjust enrichment and general principles of co-ownership, and does not amount to an infringement claim.” What each co-owner may do with a shared copyright, and how co-owners divide its income, is covered in how co-owners share revenue from a jointly owned copyright or patent.
What Rights Does the Company Keep Without an Assignment?
A company that asked a founder to write code and received it may hold an implied nonexclusive license to use it, which is permission to use the code, not ownership of it. An unwritten license lacks the protection 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) gives a signed license against a conflicting transfer. The writing rule in § 204(a) does not reach that kind of license, because 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”
In Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), a special effects company made film footage at a producer’s request and delivered it with no written transfer. The Ninth Circuit held that the creator impliedly licensed the footage because it “created a work at defendant’s request and handed it over, intending that defendant copy and distribute it.” The court relied on an earlier case in which a writer’s implied license ran to a partnership he had formed with a publisher to create a book. That setting is close to co-founders building a product together.
The Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis to computer programs in Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2008). It looked at the programmer’s “objective intent at the time of the creation and delivery of the software,” and held that “Gagnon granted AMS an unlimited, nonexclusive license to retain, use, and modify the software.” It added that “because AMS paid consideration, this license is irrevocable.”
A license has limits. In Effects, the court said the creator “may license, sell or give away for nothing its remaining rights in the special effects footage.” A licensee’s use beyond the license can also infringe: a footnote in Effects says of the publisher in the partnership case it relied on, “By publishing the other writer’s book, Ries exceeded the scope of his implied license to use Oddo’s articles and was liable for copyright infringement.” These are Ninth Circuit decisions. How courts find an implied license in other settings is covered on its own page.
How Do Confirmatory and Nunc Pro Tunc Assignments Fix the Gap?
A confirmatory assignment is a writing the founder signs now confirming that the founder transferred the code to the company earlier. It is sometimes labeled nunc pro tunc, Latin for “now for then.” Under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a), a transfer other than by operation of law is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance “or a note or memorandum of the transfer” is in writing and signed by the owner. A later note or memorandum can therefore serve where the original deal was never written down, at least where the founder and the company agree the transfer happened. Where they dispute it, a Ninth Circuit decision described below required a writing made at about the time of the agreement. Two federal courts of appeals have accepted a later writing, each in a suit against a third-party infringer and each stating its rule for a case with no dispute between the owner and the transferee.
In Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Development Group, Inc., 70 F.3d 96 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit adopted the view that a copyright owner’s “later execution of a writing which confirms an earlier oral agreement validates the transfer ab initio,” meaning from the start. The court added that “where there is no dispute between the copyright owner and the transferee about the status of the copyright, it would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a third-party infringer to invoke section 204(a) to avoid suit for copyright infringement.” The designer and the home builder there signed a confirming agreement after the infringement and sued together, and in a case “where both the original owner and the transferee have joined as plaintiffs in the same lawsuit,” the court would “not let the alleged infringer invoke section 204(a).” It held that the written agreement “cured any defects in” the builder’s standing. In the earlier suit, the trial court held that the first written transfer did not carry the right to sue for earlier copying, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed without opinion.
In Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit read § 204(a) to mean that “an oral transfer can be given legal effect by a subsequent signed writing,” though “it is possible for a writing to be simply too far removed in time from the event it purports to memorialize, so that there can be no validation of the past event.” It held that the memorandum “does not itself constitute the transfer,” so the party relying on it had to present evidence, “apart from the Memorandum of Transfer itself,” that the oral transfer happened. One architect had signed that memorandum for both firms, with the transferring firm’s president, nearly nine years after the claimed transfer; the court affirmed summary judgment against the firm that relied on it. On a Ninth Circuit decision that, in Barefoot’s description, required the writing to be “executed more or less contemporaneously with the agreement,” the Third Circuit held that in “a case in which there is no dispute between transferor and transferee,” “a third-party infringer in such a case cannot evade liability by invoking § 204(a) and demanding a contemporaneously-drafted instrument.”
I suggest four steps for the confirming writing, because each answers a rule above:
- The founder who wrote the code should sign it, because 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) requires a writing “signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.”
- It should state the date it is signed and recite when and how the earlier transfer happened, because Barefoot required evidence apart from the writing. For the same reason, the emails, cap-table notes, or minutes that show the transfer should stay on file.
- It should assign claims for past infringement expressly, because under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), an owner may sue for infringement “committed while he or she is the owner of it.”
- A notary should acknowledge the signature, because under 17 U.S.C. § 204(b), “A certificate of acknowledgement is not required for the validity of a transfer, but is prima facie evidence of the execution of the transfer if,” for a transfer signed in the United States, “the certificate is issued by a person authorized to administer oaths within the United States.” Prima facie evidence is proof a court accepts until the other side disproves it.
Recording the signed writing with the Copyright Office is optional under 17 U.S.C. § 205(a). Its timing can still decide who owns the code if the founder also signs a conflicting transfer. A mortgage of the copyright to a lender is one, because § 101 counts a mortgage as a transfer. Under § 205(d), “As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.” Recording gives that constructive notice under § 205(c) only if “the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains” so a reasonable search would reveal it, and “registration has been made for the work.” I suggest registering the code and recording the assignment soon after the founder signs, because a later transfer recorded first can prevail on the conditions quoted above. Check the current text of section 205 before relying on these periods.
Why Does an Unassigned Founder Copyright Matter in a Financing or Sale?
An unassigned founder copyright matters because a company holding only a license cannot bring an infringement action over the code under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) or promise exclusive rights in it. The founder keeps the remaining rights. Effects described what the creator keeps: it “may license, sell or give away for nothing its remaining rights” in the work. A company in that position cannot tell an investor or buyer that no one else may use the code.
The right to sue follows ownership too. Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), “The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.” A nonexclusive license is not a transfer of any exclusive right under § 101, so a company holding only a license holds no right that section names.
Registration adds evidence to the record. Under 17 U.S.C. § 410(c), “In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” For a later registration, “The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.” In JustMed, Byce, the shareholder and director, sent part of the code to the Copyright Office.
Before a financing or sale, the record should answer the ownership question for each person who wrote the code. For each one, it shows employment within the scope of the job, a signed assignment, or a signed confirmatory assignment with the evidence behind it. For a listed kind of commissioned work, a written work-made-for-hire agreement signed by that person and the company also answers it. I suggest closing any gap while the founders still work together, because under § 204(a) the confirming writing needs the signature of the founder or the founder’s authorized agent.
How Does a Founder’s Equity Bear on the IP Dispute?
A founder’s equity can bear on the code dispute, because Minnesota’s corporation and LLC statutes let a founder pay for shares or make an LLC contribution with intangible property. The records of that deal can show whether the code was part of it. In a corporation, under Minn. Stat. § 302A.405, subd. 1, “Shares may be issued for any consideration, including, without limitation, money or other tangible or intangible property received by the corporation or to be received by the corporation under a written agreement, or services rendered to the corporation or to be rendered to the corporation.” The shares are issued “as authorized by resolution approved by the affirmative vote of the directors required by section 302A.237,” so the board resolution and any subscription agreement show what the founder’s shares were issued for.
I suggest reading those documents before anything else, because under § 302A.405, subd. 3, “a written agreement to transfer property to a corporation in the future is fully paid when the note, check, or written agreement is delivered to the corporation, and consideration in the form of services to be rendered to the corporation is fully paid when the issuance of the shares is authorized or approved pursuant to subdivision 1, paragraph (a).” A signed writing that transfers the code itself, rather than promising a future transfer, can also be the instrument of conveyance § 204(a) calls for.
Subdivision 3 also makes people liable when shares are issued in violation of its paragraph (a). That paragraph provides: “A corporation shall issue only shares that are nonassessable or that are assessable but are issued with the unanimous consent of the shareholders.” “Nonassessable” shares are those “for which the agreed consideration has been fully paid, delivered, or rendered to the corporation.” When shares are issued in violation of that rule, “the following persons are jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the difference between the agreed consideration for the shares and the consideration actually received by the corporation,” including “The person to whom the shares were issued.” The same subdivision provides: “An action shall not be maintained against a person under paragraph (b) unless commenced within two years from the date on which shares are issued in violation of paragraph (a).” Check the current text of section 302A.405 before relying on this period.
In an LLC, under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0402, “A contribution may consist of tangible or intangible property or other benefit to a limited liability company.” Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0403, subd. 1, “If a person does not make a required contribution, the person or the person’s estate is obligated to contribute money equal to the value of the part of the contribution which has not been made, at the option of the company.” Whether the code was a required contribution turns on the operating agreement and the members’ records.
Vesting and repurchase terms in a co-founder agreement decide what happens to a departing founder’s unvested shares, and those terms can become part of the trade that settles the code. If the dispute also involves taking the founder off the board or out of an office, removing a co-owner from a Minnesota business covers those steps.
How Do Patents and the Company Name Fit Into a Founder IP Dispute?
Patents and trademarks follow their own ownership rules, so a founder dispute over code can carry a separate patent or brand question. In JustMed, Joel Just and Byce applied for a patent as co-inventors in 1995, years before Joel and Ann Just formed the company in 2003. For patents, under 35 U.S.C. § 262, “In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.”
A patent does not pass to the company the way a work made for hire does. The Supreme Court said in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) that “A patent is property and title to it can pass only by assignment,” and 35 U.S.C. § 261 provides that “Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.” The Court also stated three rules for employees. One hired to make an invention must assign the patent to the employer. General employment does not require an assignment absent an express agreement. One who invents during working hours with the employer’s materials owes the employer only “a non-exclusive right to practice the invention.” Under § 261, “An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.” Check the current text of section 261 before relying on this period.
If a founder signed an employment agreement with an invention-assignment provision, Minn. Stat. § 181.78, subd. 1, provides that the provision “shall not apply to an invention for which no equipment, supplies, facility or trade secret information of the employer was used and which was developed entirely on the employee’s own time,” when the invention also meets the subdivision’s further conditions. Who keeps the company name and brand after a founder leaves is covered in whether a departing founder can use the company name.
What Are the Options for Resolving a Co-Founder IP Dispute?
The options run from a conversation between the founders to a lawsuit, and the right one depends on whether the founders can still deal with each other and on what each side wants.
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A direct founder-to-founder conversation. This fits when the relationship still works and the gap is an oversight. It needs no filing, and it can end with a signed confirmatory assignment.
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A negotiated confirmatory assignment. This fits when the founder wants something in return: cash, a change to vesting or repurchase terms, a mutual release, or a license back to use the code for something that does not compete. The risk is a writing that recites a transfer nobody can show happened, which Barefoot would not accept on its own. A release from a founder who was the company’s employee can reach employment claims. For Minnesota Human Rights Act claims, see the rescission right in Minn. Stat. § 363A.31, subd. 2. For federal age discrimination claims, see the knowing-and-voluntary waiver rule in 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
When the founder is also a director of a Minnesota corporation, the deal is a contract between the corporation and one or more of its directors. Under Minn. Stat. § 302A.255, subd. 1, that contract “is not void or voidable because the director or directors or the other organizations are parties” if one of the subdivision’s routes is met. The routes include these three:
- The deal was “fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved, or ratified,” and “the person asserting the validity of the contract or transaction” bears the burden of proving it.
- “The material facts as to the contract or transaction and as to the director’s or directors’ interest are fully disclosed or known to the holders of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote, and the contract or transaction is approved in good faith by (1) the holders of two-thirds of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote which are owned by persons other than the interested director or directors, or (2) the unanimous affirmative vote of the holders of all outstanding shares, whether or not entitled to vote.”
- The same material facts are fully disclosed or known to the board, and the board approves the deal in good faith “by a majority of the directors or committee members currently holding office, but the interested director or directors shall not be counted in determining the presence of a quorum and shall not vote.”
In an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409, subd. 6, provides that all of the members “may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.” Subdivision 5 makes it a defense to a claim of dealing with the company on behalf of an adverse interest “that the transaction was fair to the limited liability company.”
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A written license instead of ownership. This fits when the founder will not assign but the company only needs to keep using and changing the code. A written license states its scope, while an implied one leaves the scope to be argued from conduct, as Gagnon shows. Under 17 U.S.C. § 205(e), “A nonexclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership if the license is evidenced by a written instrument signed by the owner of the rights licensed or such owner’s duly authorized agent, and if” either “(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or (2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and without notice of it.”
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Rewriting the code. This fits when the code is small or out of date. In JustMed, Byce, the shareholder and director, changed the code’s notice to his own name and deleted the company’s copies before a merger meeting. The company spent three months recreating the code. In a 2014 unpublished decision, JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 580 F. App’x 566 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit affirmed $41,250 in damages as the replacement cost of the converted code under Idaho conversion law.
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A lawsuit. In JustMed, Byce counterclaimed for a judgment declaring him the sole author and owner, and the company won on work for hire. An infringement claim on a United States work needs registration first, except for an action over an author’s rights under section 106A(a): under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made.” Where the founder and the company co-own the code, Zuill, described above, reasoned that an infringement claim cannot lie against a co-owner. Under 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” Check the current text of section 507 before relying on this period.
Two federal courts of appeals outside the Eighth Circuit, persuasive in Minnesota, start that clock on an ownership claim once rather than with each later use. The Ninth Circuit held in Zuill that “claims of co-ownership, as distinct from claims of infringement, accrue when plain and express repudiation of co-ownership is communicated to the claimant, and are barred three years from the time of repudiation.” The Second Circuit held in Kwan v. Schlein, 634 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2011) that “An ownership claim accrues only once,” and, quoting an earlier decision, listed “[a]n express assertion of sole authorship or ownership” among the events that can start it. Kwan was an editor’s suit against the publisher that hired her and the book’s author over who wrote the book. The court held: “Where, as here, the ownership claim is time-barred, and ownership is the dispositive issue, any attendant infringement claims must fail.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on these periods.
I suggest starting with the first or second option when the founders can still talk, because the later options add cost and leave the ownership answer to a court’s weighing of factors.
Can a co-founder take the code with them when they leave?
It depends on who owns the code and on the company’s other claims. Ownership turns on whether the founder wrote the code as the company’s employee and whether the founder signed a writing that transferred it or made it a work made for hire. It also turns on whether others wrote it with the founder as a joint work; the ownership section quotes the rules. A company that asked for and received the code may hold an implied nonexclusive license, though 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) protects a license against a conflicting transfer only if a signed writing evidences it. State-law claims over taken code are covered in a former developer who copied your software.
Does a company copyright notice on the code make the company the owner?
A notice does not do that by itself. Under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a), a transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless a writing transfers it. That writing, an instrument of conveyance or a note or memorandum of the transfer, must be signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent. In JustMed, Inc. v. Byce (9th Cir. 2010), the code carried notices naming the company. Byce, a shareholder and director, later changed them to his own name, and the court decided ownership under the work-for-hire rules.
Is a founder paid only in stock an employee for copyright purposes?
It can be. In JustMed, Inc. v. Byce (9th Cir. 2010), a start-up’s shareholder and director who took over its programming was paid a regular monthly salary, much of it in stock. The court held him an employee, so the company owned the code as a work made for hire. In Kirk v. Harter (8th Cir. 1999), a programmer paid irregularly, reported on Form 1099, and given no benefits was an independent contractor who owned his programs. The answer turns on the agency factors in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989), and no one factor decides it.
Can the company date a confirmatory assignment back to when the code was written?
A later writing can confirm an earlier transfer, but it should be truthful about when it was signed. In Imperial Residential Design (11th Cir. 1995), a later writing confirming an earlier oral agreement validated the transfer from the start. In Barefoot Architect (3d Cir. 2011), the party relying on the writing needed evidence, apart from it, that the earlier transfer happened. Both stated their rule for a suit against a third-party infringer with “no dispute between” owner and transferee. I suggest dating it the day it is signed and reciting the earlier transfer, because under Barefoot the writing validates “a change in ownership that has already taken place.”
Do we have to register the copyright before suing a co-founder?
The answer turns on the kind of claim. If the founder and the company co-own the code, the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Zuill v. Shanahan (9th Cir. 1996), persuasive authority in Minnesota, that an infringement claim cannot lie against a co-owner. For other infringement claims, except for an action for a violation of an author’s rights under section 106A(a), 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) provides that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made.” The same subsection lets an applicant sue where “the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused,” if notice and a copy of the complaint are served on the Register of Copyrights.
Should the company record the founder's assignment with the Copyright Office?
Recording is optional, and I suggest it, because under 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) the timing of registration and recording decides which of two conflicting transfers of the code prevails. Under § 205(a), a transfer “may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person who executed it,” or with a certified true copy. Under § 205(c), recording gives constructive notice only if “the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains” so a reasonable search would reveal it, and “registration has been made for the work.” The confirmatory assignment section quotes the § 205(d) priority rule.
Settling Ownership of Founder Code
The founder who wrote the code owns it unless the company owns it as a work made for hire or through a signed writing transferring it. A work made for hire is code the founder wrote as the company’s employee within the scope of employment, or listed commissioned work covered by a signed work-made-for-hire agreement. For a joint work, the founder co-owns it with the other authors. The company’s fallback is a license that leaves the founder holding the rest. A truthful confirmatory assignment, signed by the founder and backed by evidence of the earlier deal, repairs the record, and the founder’s equity terms can be what pays for it. These disputes are one kind of disputes between Minnesota business owners. If a co-founder dispute over code or other IP is holding up your company, email [email protected] with a brief description, and I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.