Commercial disparagement under the common law allows a cause of action when a defendant makes a false, misleading, or deceptive representation about another’s goods or services.
Minnesota
In Minnesota, under the common law a plaintiff “may not recover for product disparagement unless plaintiff is able to prove special damages in the form of pecuniary loss directly attributable to defendant’s false statements.” Advanced Training Sys. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn. 1984). The court of appeals has distinguished product disparagement, which is not actionable per se, from business disparagement, where words that directly disparage a person in a business are actionable per se, and found no reason to treat business disparagement differently under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act than under the common law. Imperial Developers v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 518 N.W.2d 623, 627-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Minnesota’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MUDTPA”) says that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of business, vocation, or occupation, the person “disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact.” Minn. Stat. § 325D.44, Subd. 1 ¶ 8.
False Statement/Fact: A defendant’s statements can be spoken, written, or even nonverbal conduct as long as the statement itself sets forth a false statement made to consumers. But, the statements must be a fact and cannot be merely “puffery.” The Eighth Circuit has said puffery exists in two general forms: “(1) exaggerated statements of bluster or boast upon which no reasonable consumer would rely; and (2) vague or highly subjective claims of product superiority, including bald assertions of superiority.” Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390-91 (8th Cir. 2004).
Special Damages: Special damages is arguably the most important of the elements under the common law and means that a “plaintiff must be able to prove special damages in the form of pecuniary loss directly attributable to defendant’s false statements.” LensCrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1490 (D. Minn. 1996). But where a plaintiff cannot show loss of specific sales, the modern view allows proof of a general decline of business, so long as it is shown to be the result of the defendant’s disparaging statements and other possible causes are eliminated. Caswell, 352 N.W.2d at 7-8.
Product Disparagement under the Lanham Act
In 1988, Congress amended Section 43(a) of the Lanham act to include causes of action for disparaging misrepresentations about a plaintiff’s goods or services. Section 43 specifically states that a defendant
[W]ho, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action….
Most noteworthy about Section 43(a) is that a disparagement claim can only be brought against misrepresentations in “commercial advertising or promotion.” Therefore, a cause of action under Section 43(a) for product disparagement does not reach a defendant’s speech outside commercial advertising or promotion.
First Amendment Considerations: It is not hard to see that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act seeks to limit freedom of speech. In this way, the Lanham Act claim mirrors a claim for libel. The seminal case in libel actions is New York Times vs. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). The New York Times rule was developed from this case which aims to strike a balance between libel and freedom of the press. This case also established the “actual malice standard,” which means that a plaintiff must establish actual malice in publishing press reports about public officials before damages for libel can be recovered. Id.
The case of U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990) addressed this issue head on. This case dealt with defamatory statements made in comparative advertising campaigns of a health insurer and a health maintenance organization. The court found that the speech was commercial in nature, thereby diminishing its protection under the First Amendment, and,
[W]hile the speech here is protected by the First Amendment, we hold that the First Amendment requires no higher standard of liability than that mandated by the substantive law for each claim. The heightened protection of the actual malice standard is not necessary to give adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 937 (internal quotations omitted).