A cease and desist letter accusing your business of defamation is a demand from the sender, and it does not by itself require your business to remove, correct, or apologize for anything. What it signals is that the sender may sue. Whether that claim could succeed turns on what the sender must prove. The sender must show that your business told others a false statement of fact about the sender, and that the statement tends to harm the sender’s reputation. The sender may also need to show that your business knew or should have known the statement was false. Defamation in Minnesota is common law, built by court decisions rather than a statute, with several statutes beside it. This page covers a letter received before any lawsuit, over a post, email, or statement your business made about a competitor, former employee, or vendor. A letter like this is one of the business torts disputes I handle for Minnesota companies.
What Can a Defamation Cease and Desist Letter Do to Your Business?
A defamation cease and desist letter states the sender’s accusation and demand; it carries no court order. Only a court can order your business to stop a statement or pay damages. The letter does mark the start of a dispute that may be litigated, which matters for evidence and insurance.
For a defamation claim, the sender’s time to sue comes from statute. Minn. Stat. § 541.07 provides: “Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 541.05, 541.073, 541.076, or 604.205 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years.” The list begins “(1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury.” In McGaa v. Glumack, 441 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. App. 1989), relying on an earlier Minnesota Supreme Court decision, the Court of Appeals said “the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of publication.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on these periods.
For a libel or slander claim against your business, the clock in that statute runs from when the statement was published, never from the date of the letter. A later republication can support its own claim. In McGaa, the claim over the memorandum’s 1981 use was time-barred, but of its 1985 resubmission to a state senator and the governor the court wrote, “This claim is timely, but was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of absolute privilege.” On McGaa’s claim that the 1981 memorandum was hidden from him, the court wrote: “Concealment must take place through an affirmative action designed to prevent discovery.” My page on whether you have to obey a cease and desist letter covers these letters in general.
What Must the Sender Prove to Win a Defamation Claim?
The sender must prove that your business communicated the statement to someone other than the sender, that the statement is false, and that it tends to harm the sender’s reputation. The reader must also reasonably understand the statement to be about the sender. To recover actual damages, a private sender may also need to prove fault: that your business knew, or with reasonable care should have known, that the statement was false. Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 2019) restated that rule from an earlier decision. Truth defeats the claim.
In Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980), a case over a manager’s reference about a former salesperson, the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote: “In order for a statement to be considered defamatory it must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, it must be false, and it must tend to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower him in the estimation of the community.” The court added: “Truth, however, is a complete defense, and true statements, however disparaging, are not actionable.” In McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. 2013), quoting an earlier decision, the court added a fourth element: “the recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to refer to a specific individual.” Fault can matter too. In Maethner, the court restated its rule that “a private individual may recover actual damages for a defamatory publication upon proof that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the defamatory statement was false.” It reserved the question of whether that rule “requires private plaintiffs to prove negligence in all defamation cases, or whether that requirement is limited to defamation cases that involve matters of public concern.”
The burden sits with the sender. McKee states that “The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to establish a successful defamation claim,” and that “If the statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of expression or detail are immaterial.” The court concluded that “the six individual statements at issue are not actionable,” and that reading the posting “as a whole does not change our holding in this case.” I suggest testing your statement the same way, each sentence alone and then the statement as a whole, because the court read the challenged statements both ways.
Whether damages are presumed can depend on what the statement was about. Stuempges wrote that “Slanders affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office or calling are slanders per se and thus actionable without any proof of actual damages.” A statement attacking only a competitor’s product is treated differently. In Advanced Training Systems Inc. v. Caswell Equipment Co., 352 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1984), the court said allegations that a competitor produced “shoddy” goods “merely disparage the product and do not libel the producer.” It added that “plaintiff may not recover for product disparagement unless plaintiff is able to prove special damages in the form of pecuniary loss directly attributable to defendant’s false statements.” Without lost specific sales, “the modern view allows plaintiff to prove a general decline of” business, if it is shown to result from the disparaging statements and “other possible causes are eliminated.”
In Maethner, the court wrote, “we hold that a private plaintiff may not recover presumed damages for defamatory statements . . . involving a matter of public concern unless the plaintiff can establish actual malice.” Quoting an earlier decision, the court said actual malice requires proof “that the declarants spoke with the knowledge that their statements were false or with reckless disregard as to whether the statements were false or not.” It added that evidence of ill will “would not be sufficient to establish actual malice.” Because Maethner offered no evidence of harm to his reputation, the court said “his defamation claims fail as a matter of law unless he can recover presumed damages.” My page on Minnesota business defamation claims covers the claim from the sender’s side.
How Do Opinion and Privilege Protect a Business’s Statement?
A statement of pure opinion, one that cannot be proven true or false, does not support a defamation claim. A factual statement made on a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and on reasonable cause is conditionally privileged, and the sender then must prove the privilege was abused.
McKee states that “The First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion from defamation claims.” The court held that calling the physician “a real tool” was pure opinion because the term “cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating a fact and it cannot be proven true or false.” A statement that a competitor’s product failed a test, or that a vendor missed a delivery, can be checked against records and is a statement of fact.
For the privilege, Stuempges, quoting an 1899 decision, said a communication “must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must . . . be based upon reasonable or probable cause.” It stated that “once the defendant has demonstrated the existence of a conditional privilege, the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove that the privilege has been abused.” To show malice, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “made the statement from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff,” which the court quoted from a 1921 decision. In Stuempges, the court gave two grounds for denying the manager the privilege. First, the falsity of his statements, made after he had said he would give a good recommendation, “takes this case out of the realm of privilege.” Second, the court upheld the jury’s finding of abuse on the malice evidence, with Jones as the manager and Hammer as the employment agency’s interviewer who received the reference: “Since the evidence supports a jury finding that Jones acted with malice in making the statements to Hammer, it was reasonable for the jury to have determined that the conditional privilege of fair comment concerning the character of a past employee had been abused.” In Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009), the court wrote that “Malice is not proved merely by the fact that the statement has been made or by the fact that the statement is later proven to be false.”
Statements about a former employee to a prospective employer have a statute too. Under Minn. Stat. § 181.967, subd. 2, “No action may be maintained against an employer by an employee or former employee for the disclosure of information listed in subdivisions 3 to 5 about the employee to a prospective employer or employment agency as provided under this section, unless the employee or former employee demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence” that the information was false and defamatory, and “(2) the employer knew or should have known the information was false and acted with malicious intent to injure the current or former employee.” Subdivision 3 says “Subdivision 2 applies to the disclosure of the following information by a private employer in response to a request for the information” and lists dates of employment, compensation and wage history, job description and duties, “training and education provided by the employer,” and “acts of violence, theft, harassment, or illegal conduct documented in the personnel record that resulted in disciplinary action or resignation.” For that last item, “A disclosure under clause (5) must be in writing with a copy sent contemporaneously by regular mail to the employee’s last known address.” Paragraph (b) adds: “With the written authorization of the current or former employee, subdivision 2 also applies to the written disclosure of the following information by a private employer.” Its list is written evaluations conducted before the employee’s separation, written disciplinary warnings and actions in the five years before the date of the authorization, and written reasons for separation. The employer must then mail the employee a copy of what it disclosed and to whom.
Under subdivision 6, the section “does not apply to an action involving an alleged violation of chapter 363 or other statute.” A post or a statement to customers about a former employee falls outside the section. Subdivision 6 also provides that the section “does not affect the availability of other limitations on liability under common law.” The common-law privilege has its own test, and it requires a “proper occasion.” Stuempges noted that courts generally recognize a qualified privilege “between former and prospective employers as long as the statements are made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose.” Bahr agreed that “statements made in the course of an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct are protected by the qualified privilege.”
What Other Claims Can a Competitor Add to a Defamation Demand?
A competitor can add a claim under Minnesota’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act for disparaging its goods, services, or business by a false or misleading representation of fact. The main remedy is a court order stopping the practice. When the statement was in commercial advertising or promotion, a federal false-advertising claim is also possible.
Under Minn. Stat. § 325D.44, subd. 1, “A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of business, vocation, or occupation, the person” does any listed act, including when the person “disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact.” Subdivision 2 adds that “a complainant need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion or misunderstanding.” A vendor or other noncompetitor can bring the claim too. The claim turns on a representation “of fact,” so the opinion line in McKee matters here as well.
Under Minn. Stat. § 325D.45, subd. 1, “A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity and on terms that the court considers reasonable.” The same subdivision says “Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not required.” Under subdivision 2, “Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs,” and “The court may award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party if (1) the party complaining of a deceptive trade practice has brought an action knowing it to be groundless, or (2) the party charged with a deceptive trade practice has willfully engaged in the trade practice knowing it to be deceptive.”
The federal claim is in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. Subsection (a)(1)(B) reaches a person who, “in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,” among other elements of the subsection. My page on commercial disparagement under the Lanham Act covers both disparagement claims.
How Should Your Business Preserve the Statement and the Evidence?
Your business has a duty to preserve evidence once it knows or should know that litigation is reasonably foreseeable, and a letter threatening a defamation suit is notice that the sender is considering one. I suggest preserving the statement and the records behind it the day the letter arrives, because the duty does not wait for a lawsuit.
In Miller v. Lankow, 801 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2011), a homeowner had stucco removed before suing over moisture damage, and the lower courts excluded his expert evidence as a sanction. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It said the duty to preserve evidence arises “whenever a party knows or should know that litigation is reasonably foreseeable,” not only once a lawsuit is filed. It reaffirmed that “custodial parties have a duty to preserve relevant evidence for use in litigation.” Quoting an earlier decision, it said that regardless of good or bad faith, “the affirmative destruction of evidence has not been condoned.” The court then held that “the duty to preserve evidence must be tempered by allowing custodial parties to dispose of or remediate evidence when the situation reasonably requires it,” and that “a custodial party with a legitimate need to destroy evidence may be absolved of a failure to preserve evidence by providing sufficient notice and a full and fair opportunity to inspect the evidence to a noncustodial party.”
What to keep:
- The statement as published. A dated copy or screenshot, with its web address, the platform, and the account that posted it.
- Every version. Drafts, edits, and any earlier wording, so no one can later dispute what readers saw.
- Who received it. Email recipients, the audience of a post, and anyone told in person.
- The records behind each fact. Invoices, test results, emails, and other documents that show whether each factual sentence was true.
- The letter itself. The envelope or email showing when it arrived and who sent it.
I suggest pausing any routine deletion of email or messages that touch the dispute, because Miller ties the duty to what a party “knows or should know.” Under Miller, a party with a legitimate need to destroy evidence “may be absolved” by giving the other side “sufficient notice and a full and fair opportunity to inspect the evidence.”
When Does Minnesota’s Retraction Statute Apply?
Minnesota’s retraction statute applies to a libel published in a newspaper, so its words do not reach a business’s own post, email, or spoken statement. A business deciding whether to correct its statement is making a business choice, without a statutory formula behind it.
Minn. Stat. § 548.06 begins: “In an action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, the plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages, unless a retraction be demanded and refused as hereinafter provided.” It then directs that “The plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher at the principal place of publication, a notice, specifying the statements claimed to be libelous, and requesting that the same be withdrawn.” Even a published retraction leaves general damages available: “If such retraction be so published, the plaintiff may still recover general damages, unless the defendant shall show that the libelous publication was made in good faith and under a mistake as to the facts.” To count, a retraction must be published “on the same page and in the same type” as the statements complained of, with the statement “headed in 18-point type or larger” with the word RETRACTION. It must appear in a regular issue “published within one week after such service,” with stricter terms when the plaintiff was a candidate for office.
A letter demanding that your business “retract” its post borrows the statute’s vocabulary, but the statute’s terms are a newspaper, its publisher, and its regular issue. I suggest limiting any correction to what your records support, because the sender can quote every word of it against the original. My page on retracting a defamatory statement covers how a correction can be worded.
When Should Your Business Tell Its Insurer About the Letter?
Your business should read its liability policy’s notice terms when the letter arrives, because the policy, not the letter, sets what must be reported and when. Whether the insurer must defend a later lawsuit is decided by comparing the policy’s language with the complaint and the surrounding facts.
In General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2009), a trademark coverage case, the Minnesota Supreme Court said that “the allegations in the underlying complaint and the surrounding facts will be compared with the relevant language in the insurance policy.” Quoting an earlier decision, it said an insurer trying to avoid the duty to defend “has the burden of establishing that all parts of the cause of action fall clearly outside the scope of coverage.” That policy promised that the insurer “will defend any suit seeking damages because of ‘advertising injury’” covered by the policy.
A defense promise worded around a “suit” may not reach a letter, so your policy’s notice clause and its definitions decide what a pre-suit demand requires of you. Some policies exclude statements published with knowledge of their falsity, and my page on the knowingly false publication exclusion explains how that exclusion works.
How Does Minnesota’s Anti-SLAPP Law Apply to a Business Statement?
Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law offers an early motion to dismiss a lawsuit over protected activity, and it applies only once a lawsuit is filed. That activity includes speech on a matter of public concern and communications in or about a governmental proceeding. A statement by a business “primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services,” about its own sale of them, may fall within the seller exclusion in Minn. Stat. § 554.08.
The Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, Minn. Stat. § 554.08, says its sections “apply to a cause of action asserted in a civil action against a person based on the person’s” protected activities. These include a “communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding,” and a “communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding.” They also include the “exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution on a matter of public concern.” Paragraph (c) excludes a claim “against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the person’s sale or lease of the goods or services.” Paragraph (d) brings back within the act a claim “related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.” The exclusions in paragraph (c) also include a cause of action “for any claim brought under federal law,” which takes in a Lanham Act claim.
Minn. Stat. § 554.09 sets when the motion may be filed: “Not later than 60 days after a party is served with a complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which sections 554.07 to 554.19 apply, or at a later time on a showing of good cause, the party may file a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on this period.
A comparison your business published in its own marketing may fall within the seller exclusion. Paragraph (d) can still bring the claim back, as with a claim over a review or rating of a business. My page on Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law covers the motion, the public-concern test, and fee shifting, and my page on a business sued over an online review applies the act to reviews.
What Are Your Options for Responding to the Letter?
You have five practical responses: talk owner to owner, take the statement down as part of a written settlement, correct it, stand on it, or answer in writing through an attorney. The right choice depends on how much of the statement your records prove, whether it is opinion or fact, and what the relationship with the sender is worth.
- Talk owner to owner. A direct conversation fits when the sender is a vendor, customer, or competitor your business will keep dealing with, and the statement grew out of a dispute that can still be resolved. Anything you say is a new statement to the sender, so I suggest keeping to the underlying dispute and confirming any agreement in writing.
- Take it down in a written settlement. Removal fits when a factual sentence is hard to prove. Deleting a statement does not undo that it was already read, so I suggest making removal one term of an agreement in which the sender releases its claims, after saving a dated copy.
- Correct it. A correction fits when one sentence overstates what happened and the rest is true or opinion. The correction is itself a statement, so I suggest wording it to match your records and keeping both versions.
- Stand on it. This fits when every factual sentence is true and documented and the rest is opinion. Under Stuempges, truth is a complete defense, and McKee protects pure opinion. The cost is that the sender may sue, and defending a lawsuit costs money even when the defense succeeds.
- Answer in writing through an attorney. A response letter can take the accusation sentence by sentence, separate opinion from fact, tie each fact to your records, and name any privilege. It can also propose terms. A response letter is a statement too, and my page on how a cease and desist letter can backfire explains the risk an overstated letter creates for its sender. I suggest keeping any response to what the records show for that reason.
Do I have to take the post down because the letter demands it?
Not because of the letter alone. A cease and desist letter is a demand, and only a court can order your business to remove a statement. Removing it is still a choice worth weighing. Deleting a post stops new readers, but it does not undo that others already read it. In Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co. (Minn. 1980), the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that a defamatory statement “must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff.” I suggest saving a dated copy before any removal, because the words as posted are what both sides will be measured against.
Is a statement my employee made aloud to a customer treated differently from a written post?
Yes, damages rules differ. Under Larson v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931), libel needs no “allegation of special damages.” Slander is “actionable per se” for words “charging the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude” or “directly disparaging and tending to prejudice and injure a person in his office, profession, trade, or business.” Larson’s complaint over other spoken words, with “No special damages,” failed. Under Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc. (Minn. 2019), a private plaintiff “may not recover presumed damages for defamatory statements . . . involving a matter of public concern unless the plaintiff can establish actual malice.”
What if the letter comes from a former employee my business gave a reference about?
It depends on what the reference said, who received it, and how it was given. Minn. Stat. § 181.967 can bar a former employee’s claim over some reference answers a private employer gives a prospective employer or employment agency, unless the former employee makes the clear-and-convincing showing the statute requires. The section above on how opinion and privilege protect a business’s statement quotes which answers the statute covers, the limits on each, and the written authorization, written disclosure, and mailing conditions some carry. The statute “does not affect the availability of other limitations on liability under common law.”
Will my insurer pay a lawyer to answer the letter before any lawsuit?
That depends on your policy’s words, because a policy can tie the defense promise to a lawsuit. In General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin v. Wozniak Travel, Inc. (Minn. 2009), the policy said the insurer would defend “any suit” seeking damages for advertising injury. I suggest reading your policy’s notice and defense terms the day the letter arrives, because those terms decide what you must report and when the insurer’s duty begins.
Can my business recover its attorney fees if the sender sues and loses?
Possibly, depending on the claim. On an anti-SLAPP motion, Minn. Stat. § 554.16 says the court “shall award . . . reasonable attorney fees . . . related to the motion . . . to the moving party if the moving party prevails on the motion.” On a deceptive trade practices claim, Minn. Stat. § 325D.45, subd. 2 allows fees to the prevailing party if the sender “has brought an action knowing it to be groundless.” On a Lanham Act claim, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
Responding to a Defamation Demand
A cease and desist letter accusing your business of defamation is a demand. The sender’s claim still has to prove a false statement, communicated to others, that tends to harm the sender’s reputation and is understood to be about the sender. A private sender seeking actual damages may also have to prove fault, meaning your business knew or should have known it was untrue. Truth is a complete defense, pure opinion is protected, and a conditional privilege shifts the burden to the sender to prove abuse. I suggest preserving the statement and its records the day the letter arrives, because the duty to preserve evidence can arise before any lawsuit. I also suggest reading your insurance policy’s notice terms that day, because the policy sets what you must report. Minnesota’s retraction statute reaches newspapers, so any correction your business makes is a business choice. These disputes are part of my business torts practice. If your business has received a letter accusing it of defamation, email me at [email protected] with a brief description and the names of the parties. I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any documents.