When the majority owner of your Minnesota company pays themselves a salary you believe is excessive, your options run from a direct conversation to a court-ordered buyout. A majority owner who controls the board, or manages the LLC, controls the vote that sets the pay. Minnesota’s conflict-of-interest statute does not void a pay resolution because the owner voted on it. The controlling owner’s duties to you, and the court remedies in Minnesota’s corporation and LLC statutes, can still reach pay that shifts the company’s profits away from the other owners.

Minnesota sets most of these rules by statute. Corporations follow the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 302A, and LLCs follow the Minnesota Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 322C. The duty a controlling shareholder of a closely held corporation owes the other owners comes from Minnesota case law. Neither statute uses the word “excessive” or sets a dollar figure for an owner’s pay, so that question is answered with comparison evidence. This page is written for a minority shareholder of a Minnesota corporation that is not publicly traded and a minority member of a Minnesota LLC. It is part of my work on ownership disputes, and the broader claim it draws on is explained on my page about shareholder oppression claims.

Who Sets the Majority Owner’s Salary in a Minnesota Company?

A Minnesota corporation may fix the pay of its officers and employees, and its business must be managed by or under the direction of the board. That board role is subject to the articles, a unanimous vote of the shareholders entitled to vote for directors, and a shareholder control agreement. In an LLC, the answer depends on whether the members, managers, or a board of governors run the company, and the operating agreement can change the statute’s default. When the majority owner controls the board, the majority owner controls the vote on their own pay.

A corporation may appoint officers and employees and “fix their compensation” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.161, subd. 18). Its business “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board, subject to the provisions of subdivision 2 and section 302A.457, and except as may be otherwise provided in the articles” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.201, subd. 1). Under subdivision 2, the holders of the shares entitled to vote for directors “may, by unanimous affirmative vote, take any action that this chapter requires or permits the board to take” (§ 302A.201, subd. 2), and Minn. Stat. § 302A.457 governs a written shareholder control agreement.

A Minnesota LLC follows one of three default rules in Minn. Stat. § 322C.0407:

  1. Member-managed. “Each member has equal rights in the management and conduct of the company’s activities,” and an ordinary-course difference “may be decided by a majority of the members” (subd. 2). The chapter “does not entitle a member to remuneration for services performed for a member-managed limited liability company, except for reasonable compensation for services rendered in winding up” (subd. 7), so a member’s salary rests on the operating agreement or a decision of the members. By default, “An act outside the ordinary course of the activities of the company may be undertaken only with the consent of all members” (subd. 2).
  2. Manager-managed. Any matter relating to the company’s activities “is decided exclusively by the managers,” except as the chapter expressly provides, and the consent of all members is required to “undertake any other act outside the ordinary course of the company’s activities” (subd. 3).
  3. Board-managed. The company is managed “by and under the direction of a board of governors” (subd. 4).

The operating agreement governs the members’ relations and the company’s activities “Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions 2 and 3” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110, subd. 1). “To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter described in subdivision 1, this chapter governs the matter” (subd. 2). Among the limits in subdivision 3, an operating agreement may not “unreasonably restrict the duties and rights stated in section 322C.0410,” “vary the power of a court to decree dissolution in the circumstances specified in section 322C.0701, subdivision 1, clauses (4) and (5),” or “unreasonably restrict the right of a member to maintain an action under sections 322C.0901 to 322C.0906.” It also may not, “subject to subdivisions 4 to 7, eliminate the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 322C.0409, subdivision 4” (subd. 3). Pay set without any board or member action raises its own questions, covered on my page about setting compensation without board approval.

Why Does Minnesota’s Conflict-of-Interest Statute Not Void a Resolution Fixing a Director’s Pay?

Minnesota’s director conflict-of-interest statute does not void a resolution setting a director’s own pay because that director was present and voted. The pay is still tested against the director’s duty of good faith and the controlling owner’s duties to the other shareholders, so the vote alone does not make the amount fair. The statute’s approval routes for other director deals do not apply to a pay resolution. Minn. Stat. § 302A.255, subd. 2(a), says a pay resolution is not treated as a contract or transaction for purposes of the section.

The rule is in Minn. Stat. § 302A.255, subd. 2(a): “A resolution fixing the compensation of a director or fixing the compensation of another director as a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, is not void or voidable or considered to be a contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors for purposes of this section even though the director receiving the compensation fixed by the resolution is present and voting at the meeting of the board or a committee at which the resolution is authorized, approved, or ratified.”

For other deals between a corporation and a director, subdivision 1 gives four routes to validity. One requires the person defending the deal to prove it was “fair and reasonable as to the corporation at the time it was authorized, approved, or ratified.” Another lets disinterested directors approve after disclosure, and “the interested director or directors shall not be counted in determining the presence of a quorum and shall not vote.” Because subdivision 2(a) says a pay resolution is not “considered to be a contract or other transaction” for purposes of the section, those routes do not apply to it.

What does apply is the standard of conduct. A director “shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.251, subd. 1). The articles may limit a director’s personal liability for money damages, but they “shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director,” among other exceptions, “for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit” (subd. 4). Whether directors step aside from votes on their own pay as a governance practice is covered on my page about directors voting on their own pay.

What Duties Does a Controlling Owner Owe When Setting Their Own Pay?

A controlling shareholder of a closely held Minnesota corporation owes the other shareholders fiduciary duties under Minnesota case law, and those duties include, in the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ words, a “substantive obligation, for instance, not to withhold dividends or use corporate assets preferentially.” In an LLC, the statute sets loyalty and good-faith duties, and whether they fall on the members, the managers, or the governors depends on how the company is managed.

In a corporation. In U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 802 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 2011), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that “the common law of closely held corporations is still in effect.” The court identified a closely held corporation by three traits: shareholders are usually active in the business, there is usually no market for a minority interest, and dividends are seldom distributed. It explained, citing an earlier decision, that minority shareholders are vulnerable “because a majority shareholder can deny them income by refusing to employ them or pay dividends.” Quoting an earlier decision, it said co-owners owe each other “the highest standard of integrity and good faith in their dealings with each other,” and it declined to define that standard further. The company in that case had more than 300 shareholders, and the minority owners’ claims failed.

The Court of Appeals has said the duty includes dealing “openly, honestly and fairly with other shareholders” (Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. App. 1992), quoting an earlier decision). The substantive-obligation language comes from Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. App. 2001), where the court described the duty while deciding a fired shareholder-employee’s claim. In deciding whether to order relief in a closely held corporation’s case, the court must also consider “the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 3a).

In an LLC. The duty of loyalty in Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409 includes the duty “to refrain from dealing with the company in the conduct or winding up of the company’s activities as or on behalf of a person having an interest adverse to the company” (subd. 2). The statute gives a defense “that the transaction was fair to the limited liability company” (subd. 5). In a manager-managed LLC, subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 “apply to the manager or managers and not the members” (subd. 7), and in a board-managed LLC they “apply to the governors and not the members” (subd. 8). In both forms, “A member does not have any fiduciary duty to the company or to any other member solely by reason of being a member” (subd. 7 and subd. 8). Every member, majority and minority alike, must act “consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing,” which includes acting “in a manner, in light of the operating agreement, that is honest, fair, and reasonable” (subd. 4).

How Do You Tell Whether a Salary Is Actually Excessive?

You tell by comparison, because neither of Minnesota’s entity statutes sets a figure or formula for an owner’s pay. The comparison weighs the salary against what the role is worth, what the owner does, and what the other owners receive from the same profits. The evidence can include market pay for the role, the work the owner actually does, pay history against profits and distributions, and what the owners’ agreements say.

I suggest building the comparison from these sources, because each one answers a different reason the majority owner may give for the pay:

  1. Market pay for the role. A compensation study from a CPA or compensation consultant shows what companies of similar size and industry pay for the same position.
  2. The work actually done. Duties, hours, and results show whether the owner’s role grew with the pay or stayed the same.
  3. Pay history against profits and distributions. Several years of financial statements show whether pay rose as distributions to the other owners fell.
  4. What other owner-employees are paid. A gap between owners doing comparable work can be evidence that the pay follows ownership control instead of the job.
  5. What the agreements say. An employment agreement, a shareholder or operating agreement, and the minutes approving the pay show what the owners agreed to.

Minnesota’s appellate decisions describe both sides of the comparison. Owners of closely held corporations often take their return as pay. The Minnesota Supreme Court explained in Whetstone v. Hossfeld Manufacturing Co., 457 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. 1990), citing an earlier decision and a treatise, that “the investors’ return on investment often comes only in the form of compensation for serving as directors or officers rather than from dividends on stock.” In Gunderson, the Court of Appeals cited a law review article stating that it is a breach of fiduciary duty for a controlling shareholder “to appropriate overmuch of the enterprise’s economic benefits.” The comparison shows which of those descriptions fits your company.

How Do You Get the Company’s Pay and Financial Records?

You demand them in writing. A shareholder of a Minnesota corporation that is not publicly held “has an absolute right, upon written demand,” to examine and copy certain records at any reasonable time (Minn. Stat. § 302A.461, subd. 4). Those records include the board and shareholder minutes, financial statements, and the other records the statute lists. The corporation “shall make available within ten days after receipt by an officer of the corporation of the written demand” the share register and those records (subd. 4).

The listed records include “records of all proceedings of the board for the last three years” and the company’s financial statements (subd. 2). Payroll detail, the general ledger, and any employment terms for the owner outside the board’s records fall under “other corporate records,” which a shareholder may examine “only if” the shareholder “demonstrates a proper purpose for the examination.” A proper purpose “is one reasonably related to the person’s interest as a shareholder” (subd. 4). I suggest stating in the demand how the records bear on the value of your shares and the fairness of the pay, because the statute conditions those records on that showing. The corporation must also “keep appropriate and complete financial records” (subd. 3), and if the corporation violates the section, a court may “specifically enforce this section and award expenses, including attorney fees and disbursements” (subd. 4). A shareholder who gains access to a record under the section “may not use or furnish to another for use the corporate record or a portion of the contents for any purpose other than a proper purpose” (subd. 4b).

For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0410 turns on the management form. In a member-managed LLC, on reasonable notice and during regular business hours, a member may inspect “any record maintained by the company regarding the company’s activities, financial condition, and other circumstances,” to the extent the information is material to the member’s rights and duties (subd. 1). In a manager-managed or board-managed LLC, a member may obtain information “as is just and reasonable” when three conditions are met. The member seeks it for a purpose material to the member’s interest as a member, “the member makes a demand in a record received by the company, describing with reasonable particularity the information sought and the purpose for seeking the information,” and “the information sought is directly connected to the member’s purpose” (subd. 2). “Within ten days after receiving a demand,” the company must answer in a record, saying what it will provide and its reasons for declining anything (subd. 2). The details, including limits on how you may use what you receive, are on my page about a minority owner’s right to demand company information.

When Can Excessive Pay Support an Unfair-Prejudice Claim?

Excessive pay can support a shareholder’s claim under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 when it is part of conduct “unfairly prejudicial” toward the minority, or when it means the company’s assets are misapplied or wasted. Those are two separate grounds. When the injury is to the corporation and only indirectly harms the shareholder, the claim “must be pursued as a derivative claim” on the corporation’s behalf (Wessin v. Archives Corp., 592 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1999)). The Minnesota Supreme Court applied that rule to claims pled under § 302A.751. For the unfair-prejudice ground, the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Cold Spring Granite that unfairly prejudicial conduct “includes conduct that violates the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder,” and it left open whether other conduct can also qualify. In Gunderson, the Court of Appeals looked to written or oral agreements, and to a course of dealing that implies an agreement, to judge those expectations.

The statute lets a shareholder sue when “the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely held corporation” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3)), and when “the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted” (subd. 1(b)(5)). The Court of Appeals reads unfairly prejudicial conduct to include conduct that violates or frustrates a minority shareholder’s reasonable expectations. The term “is liberally construed” (Lund v. Lund, 924 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. App. 2019), citing Cold Spring Granite).

How the claim is brought matters when the harm is money taken from the company. In Wessin, minority shareholders of a closely held corporation sued in their own names, alleging that the majority shareholder misappropriated and wasted corporate assets. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that “Where the injury is to the corporation, and only indirectly harms the shareholder, the claim must be pursued as a derivative claim.” Claims pled under § 302A.751, subdivisions 1(b)(2) and 1(b)(3), were still “traditional derivative claims subject to the derivative pleading requirements,” and the court declined to excuse closely held corporations from those requirements. It reinstated the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice. The Court of Appeals applied that rule to a 20% owner’s claim that the 80% owner paid himself excessive compensation, concluding that “section 302A.751 does not give Blohm a direct cause of action against Kelly in these circumstances” (Blohm v. Kelly, 765 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. App. 2009)). A derivative complaint “shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort” (Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.09).

Three parts of the statute bear on a pay claim:

  1. Profits are no defense by themselves. The court “shall not refuse to order equitable relief, dissolution, or a buy-out solely on the ground that the corporation has accumulated or current operating profits” (§ 302A.751, subd. 3). Profits create no default right to a payout, though. A corporation’s board decides whether to make a distribution (Minn. Stat. § 302A.551, subd. 1). An LLC member has a right to one only if the company decides to make it (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0404, subd. 2). For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, and subject to its operating agreement, distributions “must be allocated in proportion to the value of the contributions of the members” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.1204, subd. 3).
  2. Agreements set the expectations. In a closely held corporation, written agreements, “including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements,” are “presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements” (§ 302A.751, subd. 3a). Gunderson adds that courts may rely on written or oral agreements and “may also look to a course of dealing that implies an agreement.”
  3. Size matters for subdivision 3a. A closely held corporation “means a corporation which does not have more than 35 shareholders” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.011, subd. 6a). Cold Spring Granite read subdivision 3a as applying by its terms only to statutory closely held corporations, then used it to guide the reasonable-expectations reading for a larger corporation that shared the common-law traits.

The Minnesota appellate decisions on this page do not hold that a particular salary was unfairly prejudicial. The § 302A.751 decisions applied the test to other conduct: firing a shareholder-employee, a family-business dispute over liquidity, or forcing minority owners out in a reverse stock split. Whetstone was a dissenters’ rights case that did not decide a § 302A.751 claim. There, the Minnesota Supreme Court listed, among decisions a minority owner without a veto cannot control, decisions to “Drain off earnings by paying excessive salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits, or excessive travel and entertainment expenses” and to “Not pay dividends,” citing a law journal article.

For an LLC, a member may apply for dissolution, or a lesser remedy, when those in control “have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0701, subd. 1(5)). The definition reaches conduct by those in control that affects the member as a member, manager, or governor, or as an employee of an LLC with 35 or fewer members. “Oppressive” means conduct “that is unfairly prejudicial to the applicant member in a capacity listed in clause (2), because the conduct frustrated an expectation of the applicant member that” meets four conditions (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0102, subd. 18). The expectation must be “reasonable in light of the reasonable expectations of the other members”; it must have been “material to the applicant’s decision to become a member” or “for a substantial time” material during membership; it must have been “known to other members or that the other members had reason to know”; and it must not be “contrary to the operating agreement as applied consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing.” A member suing directly “must plead and prove an actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or threatened to be suffered by the limited liability company” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0901, subd. 2). For a claim brought on the company’s own behalf, the first step is explained on my page about the shareholder derivative demand.

What Can a Minnesota Court Order About the Salary?

In a shareholder’s action under § 302A.751, once “it is established that” one of the statute’s grounds exists, a Minnesota court “may grant any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances” (subd. 1). When the injury is to the corporation and only indirectly harms the shareholder, the claim “must be pursued as a derivative claim” on the corporation’s behalf, under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Wessin. In that action, involving a corporation that is not publicly held, the court may also order a buyout of either side’s shares if it finds the order fair and equitable to all parties (subd. 2). Before ordering dissolution, the court must consider whether lesser relief, such as a buyout, would be adequate.

The remedies in Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 work this way:

  1. Equitable relief. In an action by a shareholder “when it is established that” a listed ground exists, subdivision 1 allows “any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances” and does not list the forms that relief can take.
  2. Lesser relief before dissolution. “In deciding whether to order dissolution, the court shall consider whether lesser relief suggested by one or more parties, such as any form of equitable relief, a buy-out, or a partial liquidation, would be adequate to permanently relieve the circumstances” the shareholder established, and “Lesser relief may be ordered in any case where it would be appropriate under all the facts and circumstances of the case” (subd. 3b).
  3. A buyout either way. On motion of the corporation or a shareholder, the court may “order the sale by a plaintiff or a defendant of all shares” if the order “would be fair and equitable to all parties under all of the circumstances of the case” (subd. 2). The price mechanics are on my page about a court-ordered buyout.
  4. Expenses for bad faith. A court may award reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, against a party that “has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith” (subd. 4).

Where you file is fixed by statute. A § 302A.751 case “shall be brought in a court within the county in which the registered office of the corporation is located” (subd. 5). An LLC oppression case under § 322C.0701, subd. 1(5), “must be brought in a court within the county in which the registered office of the limited liability company is located” (subd. 3). In that case, the court “may order a remedy other than dissolution, which may include the sale for fair value of all membership interests a member owns” to the company or other members (subd. 2).

How Does the Tax Side of an Owner’s Salary Work?

For federal income tax, the company may deduct “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered” (26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1)). The deduction reaches only a reasonable allowance, so the size of the majority owner’s pay also bears on the company’s return. I suggest asking a CPA to analyze the pay against market data, because that comparison bears on the deduction and is also the evidence the ownership dispute turns on.

When the dispute is about owners receiving unequal payments outside salary, the issues are covered on my page about non-pro-rata distributions.

What Are the Ways to Resolve It Without a Lawsuit?

You can address an excessive salary by talking with the majority owner using the numbers, proposing an objective way to set pay, writing the result into an agreement, or negotiating a buyout. Each fits a different relationship and carries its own risk. Each option can start from the comparison and the records, so the discussion turns on numbers both owners can check.

  1. An owner-to-owner conversation. This fits when the relationship still works. I suggest bringing the comparison and the records, because a conversation about numbers is easier to resolve than one about motives. The risk is that the majority owner treats it as the start of a dispute.
  2. An objective pay process. You can propose an outside compensation study, a pay formula tied to profits, distributions on a set schedule, or approval of owner pay by owners who are not receiving it. In a member-managed or manager-managed LLC, “All of the members” may authorize or ratify, “after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409, subd. 6).
  3. A written agreement. In a corporation, a written agreement on “the declaration and payment of distributions” and “the employment of shareholders” is “valid and specifically enforceable” when properly signed (Minn. Stat. § 302A.457, subd. 2(a)). It must be signed by everyone who is a shareholder on the date it first becomes effective “and the subscribers for shares, whether or not voting shares, to be issued” (subd. 2(a)). That procedure is not “the exclusive method of agreement among shareholders or between the shareholders and the corporation” (subd. 4). Whetstone, quoting an earlier decision, described such agreements’ “most common features” as “the right to limit or veto salary increases and employment decisions and the right to some control over dividend declarations.” In an LLC, the statute’s default requires every member’s consent to amend the operating agreement. In a member-managed LLC, it “may be amended only with the consent of all members” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0407, subd. 2), and a manager-managed LLC needs the same consent (subd. 3).
  4. A negotiated buyout. If the relationship cannot be repaired, a sale of your interest to the company or the majority owner ends the dispute. My page on how to buy out a business partner covers how the price is set.

I suggest not cutting back your own work, taking company money, or changing payroll yourself. A corporation’s business is managed “by or under the direction of a board” (§ 302A.201, subd. 1), and the LLC good-faith duty binds every member (§ 322C.0409, subd. 4). If the concern goes beyond salary to personal expenses run through the company, my page on a co-owner taking company money covers that problem.

Do I have a right to a distribution when the company is profitable?

You do not have one by default. In a Minnesota corporation, the board decides whether to authorize a distribution, and only after determining the company can still pay its debts in the ordinary course (Minn. Stat. § 302A.551, subd. 1). An LLC member has that right before dissolution only if the company decides to make an interim distribution (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0404, subd. 2). Subject to Minn. Stat. § 322C.1204, those distributions must by default be in equal shares among members and dissociated members (subd. 1). For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, and subject to its operating agreement, the equal-shares rule “does not apply,” and distributions “must be allocated in proportion to the value of the contributions of the members” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.1204, subd. 3). A judge also may not refuse relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 solely because the corporation is profitable.

Can I be forced to sell my shares if I complain about the salary?

A court can order it, the order can run either way, and some sales need no court. In a case under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751 involving a corporation that is not publicly held, once a ground is established, the corporation or a shareholder may move for a buyout. The court may then order a plaintiff or a defendant to sell all their shares if the order is fair and equitable to all parties. Outside court, the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Cold Spring Granite that “shareholders may be forced out involuntarily by statute, for example, in a cash-out merger,” and the buy-sell agreement in the Court of Appeals’ Gunderson case “specifically provided for the involuntary removal of shareholders with or without cause.” A court may also award reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, against a party that acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith (subd. 4). A complaint alone does not trigger a court-ordered buyout or an expense award.

Does it matter that our LLC is manager-managed?

Yes. In a manager-managed Minnesota LLC, any matter relating to the company’s activities is decided exclusively by the managers, except as the statute expressly provides (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0407, subd. 3). The duties of loyalty and care sit with the managers, and a member has no fiduciary duty solely by being a member (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409, subd. 7). Your records rights also narrow. You may obtain information “as is just and reasonable” if you seek it for a purpose material to your interest as a member (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0410, subd. 2). Your demand must be in a record the company receives and describe with reasonable particularity the information and your purpose. The information must also be directly connected to that purpose. The good-faith duty still binds every member.

Can a shareholder agreement cap the majority owner's salary?

Yes. One route is a written agreement under Minn. Stat. § 302A.457, subd. 2(a), on matters including the employment of shareholders and the payment of distributions. It is valid and specifically enforceable if signed by all persons who are shareholders on the date it first becomes effective and by the subscribers for shares to be issued. That procedure is not “the exclusive method of agreement” among shareholders (subd. 4). In a closely held corporation’s case under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, written agreements among shareholders, or between shareholders and the corporation, are presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations “concerning matters dealt with in the agreements” (subd. 3a). An LLC can reach the same result in its operating agreement.

What if the majority owner says the operating agreement allows the pay?

Then the operating agreement is the first place to look. It governs the members’ relations except as Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110 provides, and the statute fills what it does not cover (subd. 1 and 2). If not manifestly unreasonable, it may restrict or eliminate the duty to refrain from dealing with the company on behalf of an adverse interest (subd. 4). Among other limits, it may not eliminate the duty of loyalty outside the changes subdivisions 4 to 7 allow, or unreasonably restrict your records rights (subd. 3). It also may not vary a court’s power to order dissolution on the grounds in Minn. Stat. § 322C.0701, subd. 1, clauses (4) and (5), which include oppressive conduct (§ 322C.0110, subd. 3). A good-faith disagreement about what the agreement means is not oppressive conduct by itself (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0102, subd. 18).

Responding to an Excessive Owner Salary

Whether an owner salary is excessive is tested against the controlling owner’s duties and the owners’ reasonable expectations, and the facts are in the company’s records. I suggest demanding the records, having a CPA build a market-pay comparison, and raising the numbers with the majority owner. Those steps should come before choosing between a written agreement, a buyout, or a claim under § 302A.751 or § 322C.0701, because each choice depends on what the numbers show. In a corporation, a claim over harm to the company and only indirectly to you is brought on the company’s behalf: under Wessin, it “must be pursued as a derivative claim.” Taking part in a practice without objection can also count against a later claim: in Gunderson, the Court of Appeals said a shareholder who joined in the company’s informal decision-making “cannot now conveniently premise a claim of unfairly prejudicial conduct on the very practice in which he participated routinely without objection.” Each claim under § 302A.751 or § 322C.0701 has its own limitations period. More on this area is on my ownership disputes page.

If you own a minority stake in a Minnesota company and believe the majority owner’s pay is excessive, email [email protected] with a brief description. I can then start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.