When the owners of a Minnesota corporation or LLC never signed a shareholder agreement or operating agreement, the default rules of the Minnesota statute that governs the company decide their dispute. For a corporation, that is Chapter 302A, as changed by the articles, any bylaws, and the board resolutions and shareholder agreements the chapter allows. For an LLC, it is Chapter 322C, which also treats an oral or implied agreement among all the members as an operating agreement. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.1204, subd. 2, “Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 3, on and after January 1, 2018, this chapter governs all limited liability companies,” and subdivision 3 sets some different defaults for an LLC formed before August 1, 2015.
This page is for shareholders of a closely held Minnesota corporation and members of a Minnesota LLC who are in a shareholder dispute with a co-owner and have no signed agreement. It covers who controls the company, who gets paid, and which records each owner can see. It also covers how an owner leaves or is pushed out, what a court can order, and how bylaws, past practice, and spoken deals fill the gaps.
What Rules Govern an Owner Dispute When There Is No Shareholder Agreement?
Without a signed agreement, the statute that governs the company supplies the rules, and the company’s own documents change them only where the statute allows. For a corporation, Minn. Stat. § 302A.111, subd. 2, lists default rules that “govern a corporation unless modified in the articles or in a shareholder control agreement under section 302A.457.” Subdivision 3 lists a second group of rules that “govern a corporation unless modified in the articles, in a shareholder control agreement under section 302A.457, or in the bylaws.” A shareholder control agreement is a written agreement among the shareholders under Minn. Stat. § 302A.457. With no control agreement, the subdivision 2 defaults change through the articles, and the subdivision 3 defaults change through the articles or the bylaws. Under § 302A.111, subd. 4, a separate list of optional provisions “may be included either in the articles or the bylaws,” and for those the subdivision provides: “Nothing in this subdivision limits the right of the board, by resolution, to take an action that may be included in the bylaws under this subdivision without including it in the bylaws, unless it is required to be included in the bylaws by another provision of this chapter.” Under § 302A.457, subd. 4, the control-agreement procedure is not “the exclusive method of agreement among shareholders.” Some sections let an agreement set particular rights: under Minn. Stat. § 302A.551, subd. 1, distribution rights may be established by “the articles or bylaws or an agreement.”
For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110, subd. 2, says: “To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter described in subdivision 1, this chapter governs the matter.” The LLC act defines an operating agreement as “the agreement, whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all the members of a limited liability company, including a sole member” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0102, subd. 17). So an LLC with no signed document can still have an operating agreement, if all the members agreed on terms, whether spoken or implied. A member who joins later is treated as agreeing to those terms: under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0111, subd. 2, “A person that becomes a member of a limited liability company is deemed to assent to the operating agreement.”
I suggest pulling the articles, any bylaws, and the owners’ written exchanges about money and decisions first, because those records show which default rules the owners changed and how.
How Do Voting and Control Work by Default in a Minnesota Corporation?
By default, the board runs a Minnesota corporation, and the shareholders elect the board, but unless the articles or a shareholder control agreement modify it, “a corporation must allow cumulative voting for directors” (§ 302A.111, subd. 2). Minn. Stat. § 302A.201, subd. 1, provides: “The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board, subject to the provisions of subdivision 2 and section 302A.457, and except as may be otherwise provided in the articles.” Subdivision 2 lets the shareholders take a board action themselves only “by unanimous affirmative vote.”
The default voting rules work this way:
- Board decisions. The board acts by “a majority of directors present at a duly held meeting at the time the action is taken,” or a quorum-based majority if that is greater, “except where this chapter or the articles require the affirmative vote of a larger proportion or number” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.237, subd. 1).
- Shareholder decisions. Other than director elections, shareholders act by “a majority of the voting power of the shares present and entitled to vote on that item of business,” or a quorum-based majority if that is greater, “except where this chapter or the articles require a larger proportion or number” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.437, subd. 1).
- Electing directors. Unless the articles say otherwise, “directors are elected by a plurality of the voting power of the shares present and entitled to vote on the election of directors at a meeting at which a quorum is present” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.215, subd. 1).
- Cumulative voting. Unless the articles turn it off, a shareholder may cumulate votes “either by casting for one candidate the number of votes equal to the number of directors to be elected multiplied by the number of votes represented by the shares, or by distributing all of those votes on the same principle among any number of candidates.” The shareholder must give “written notice of intent to cumulate those votes to any officer of the corporation before the meeting, or to the presiding officer at the meeting at which the election is to occur at any time before the election of directors at the meeting” (§ 302A.215, subd. 2).
- Removing directors. Directors “may be removed at any time, with or without cause,” by “a majority of the voting power of all shares entitled to vote at an election of directors” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.223, subd. 3). A director elected solely by one class or series of shares “may be removed only by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of all shares of that class or series entitled to vote at an election of that director.” With cumulative voting, unless the entire board is removed at once, a director stays on if enough votes to elect that director are cast against removal (subd. 4).
- Protection from dilution. Unless the articles or the board deny or limit it, a shareholder has a preemptive right, “the right of a shareholder to acquire a certain fraction of the unissued securities or rights to purchase securities of a corporation before the corporation may offer them to other persons” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.413, subds. 1, 2). Subdivision 4 exempts several kinds of issuances, including shares “issued for a consideration other than money.”
For a minority shareholder, the practical result is that the majority holder can elect the whole board unless cumulative voting yields the minority a seat. The majority can also remove directors, but “In a corporation having cumulative voting, unless the entire board is removed simultaneously, a director is not removed from the board if there are cast against removal of the director the votes of a proportion of the voting power sufficient to elect the director at an election of the entire board under cumulative voting” (§ 302A.223, subd. 4). A director elected solely by one class or series of shares may be removed only by that class or series. A minority holder’s statutory tools include cumulative voting, preemptive rights, and the records rights below. They also include bylaw proposals by holders of “three percent or more of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote” under Minn. Stat. § 302A.181, subd. 3, and the court remedies under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751.
How Do Management and Voting Work by Default in a Minnesota LLC?
With no operating agreement saying otherwise, a Minnesota LLC is member-managed, and each member has equal rights in running it. An LLC formed before August 1, 2015, can follow a different voting rule: under § 322C.1204, subd. 3, and subject to the operating agreement, “the voting power of each membership interest is in proportion to the value of the contributions of the members reflected in the records required by item (i).” Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0407, subd. 1, “a limited liability company is a member-managed limited liability company unless the operating agreement” expressly provides that management is vested in managers or in a board, or “includes words of similar import.” For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, that test also reads the older documents. Under § 322C.1204, subd. 3, a provision quoted in full in the bylaws section, “the language in the articles of organization, and any bylaws” of such a company “will operate as if that language were in the operating agreement” once the company becomes subject to chapter 322C. So articles or bylaws that give management to a board of governors can make the company board-managed.
Subdivision 2 then sets the member-managed rules:
- “Each member has equal rights in the management and conduct of the company’s activities.”
- “A difference arising among members as to a matter in the ordinary course of the activities of the company may be decided by a majority of the members.”
- “An act outside the ordinary course of the activities of the company may be undertaken only with the consent of all members.”
- “The operating agreement may be amended only with the consent of all members.”
These rules count members, so in a two-member LLC neither member alone is a majority, and the statute gives an even split no tie-breaker. For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, the contribution-based voting power in § 322C.1204, subd. 3, quoted above, may change that count. The duties follow the management structure. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409, subd. 1, “A member of a member-managed limited liability company owes to the company and, subject to section 322C.0901, subdivision 2, the other members the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care stated in subdivisions 2 and 3.” Subdivision 4 requires every member to act “consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, including acting in a manner, in light of the operating agreement, that is honest, fair, and reasonable.”
What Are the Default Rules for Distributions?
In a corporation, the board decides whether to pay distributions. In an LLC, the company decides, and any distribution before dissolution is split in equal shares among the members and dissociated members unless an operating agreement says otherwise. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0405, subd. 1, an LLC also “may not make a distribution if after the distribution” it could not pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course, or its assets would fall below the amount that subdivision sets. A member who consents to such a distribution may be personally liable under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0406, subd. 1. For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, § 322C.1204, subd. 3, provides, subject to the operating agreement, that “section 322C.0404, subdivision 1, does not apply to the limited liability company,” and distributions follow the value of each member’s recorded contributions.
For a corporation, Minn. Stat. § 302A.551, subd. 1, provides: “The board may authorize and cause the corporation to make a distribution only if the board determines, in accordance with subdivision 2, that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business after making the distribution and the board does not know before the distribution is made that the determination was or has become erroneous.” The same subdivision allows “the rights and priorities of persons to receive distributions” to be “established by, the articles or bylaws or an agreement.” Without those documents, the § 302A.111 defaults apply: “all shares are common shares entitled to vote and are of one class and one series,” and “all shares have equal rights and preferences in all matters not otherwise provided for by the board.”
For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0404, subd. 1, provides that “any distributions made by a limited liability company before its dissolution and winding up must be in equal shares among members and dissociated members,” except as needed to honor a transfer or a charging order. Subdivision 2 adds: “A person has a right to a distribution before the dissolution and winding up of a limited liability company only if the company decides to make an interim distribution.” Under § 322C.0405, subd. 1, an LLC may not make a distribution if, after it, “the company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of the company’s activities” or “the company’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus the amount that would be needed, if the company were to be dissolved, wound up, and terminated at the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution, winding up, and termination of members whose preferential rights are superior to those of persons receiving the distribution.” A member of a member-managed LLC who consents to a distribution that violates that section, and in consenting fails to comply with § 322C.0409, “is personally liable to the company for the amount of the distribution that exceeds the amount that could have been distributed without the violation of section 322C.0405” (§ 322C.0406, subd. 1). That liability shifts to other members where the operating agreement “expressly relieves a member of the authority and responsibility to consent to distributions and imposes that authority and responsibility on one or more other members” (subd. 2).
The equal-shares rule can surprise the member who put in more money. An LLC member once contacted me about a dispute with a co-member. No operating agreement had been signed, and the member had been the primary capital contributor. One issue I raised in reply was that, without an operating agreement defining economic rights, the default rules may not reflect the actual deal between the members.
For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, the contribution rule in § 322C.1204, subd. 3, reads: “distributions of cash or other assets of the company, including distributions on termination of the limited liability company, must be allocated in proportion to the value of the contributions of the members reflected in the records required by item (i).”
What Company Records Can Each Owner Demand?
A shareholder of a privately held Minnesota corporation has an absolute right, on written demand, to the share register and the company’s core documents. An LLC member’s right depends on whether the company is member-managed, manager-managed, or board-managed. In a manager-managed or board-managed LLC, the member must make a demand in a record describing, with reasonable particularity, the information sought and the purpose. The member must also seek the information “for a purpose material to the member’s interest as a member” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0410, subd. 2). Neither right needs a shareholder or operating agreement.
For a corporation that is not publicly held, Minn. Stat. § 302A.461, subd. 4, gives each shareholder “an absolute right, upon written demand, to examine and copy, in person or by a legal representative, at any reasonable time” the share register and the documents listed in subdivision 2, and “the corporation shall make available within ten days after receipt by an officer of the corporation of the written demand” those records. That list includes the articles, the bylaws, required financial statements, and “records of all proceedings of the board for the last three years.” Other corporate records are available “only if the shareholder, beneficial owner, or holder of a voting trust certificate demonstrates a proper purpose for the examination.” If the company refuses, a court may “specifically enforce this section and award expenses, including attorney fees and disbursements.” A shareholder who receives records “may not use or furnish to another for use the corporate record or a portion of the contents for any purpose other than a proper purpose” (subd. 4b).
For a member-managed LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0410, subd. 1, provides: “On reasonable notice, a member may inspect and copy during regular business hours, at a reasonable location specified by the company, any record maintained by the company regarding the company’s activities, financial condition, and other circumstances, to the extent the information is material to the member’s rights and duties under the operating agreement or this chapter.” The company must also furnish each member, “without demand, any information concerning the company’s activities, financial condition, and other circumstances which the company knows and is material to the proper exercise of the member’s rights and duties under the operating agreement or this chapter, except to the extent the company can establish that it reasonably believes the member already knows the information.”
Subdivision 2 sets the rules “In a manager-managed or board-managed limited liability company.” There, “During regular business hours and at a reasonable location specified by the company, a member may obtain from the company and inspect and copy full information regarding the activities, financial condition, and other circumstances of the company as is just and reasonable if” each of these is true: “the member seeks the information for a purpose material to the member’s interest as a member”; “the member makes a demand in a record received by the company, describing with reasonable particularity the information sought and the purpose for seeking the information”; and “the information sought is directly connected to the member’s purpose.” Then, “Within ten days after receiving a demand pursuant to clause (2), item (ii), the company shall in a record inform the member that made the demand” what it will provide, and its reasons for declining anything it withholds. The company may impose reasonable restrictions, and “the company has the burden of proving reasonableness” (subd. 7).
I suggest making the first request in writing in either entity, because the corporate right runs “upon written demand” and a manager-managed or board-managed LLC member’s right requires a demand in a record. The steps for how to write a records demand that the company has to answer have their own page.
What Happens When an Owner Wants Out or the Others Want an Owner Gone?
Without an agreement, a corporation’s shares carry a transfer restriction only if the articles, the bylaws, a shareholder resolution, or a written action imposed one. An LLC member can transfer the right to distributions, but the transfer does not by itself let the buyer manage the company. The buyer becomes a member on a route the statute allows, such as “with the consent of all the members” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0401, subd. 4). A member who withdraws early is liable for damages and has no right to a distribution for leaving.
For a corporation, Minn. Stat. § 302A.429, subd. 1, provides: “A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of securities of a corporation may be imposed in the articles, in the bylaws, by a resolution adopted by the shareholders, or by an agreement among or other written action by a number of shareholders or holders of other securities or among them and the corporation.” It adds: “A restriction is not binding with respect to securities issued prior to the adoption of the restriction, unless the holders of those securities are parties to the agreement or voted in favor of the restriction.” Unless a written restriction is noted on the certificate or sent to holders of uncertificated shares, “a restriction, even though permitted by this section, is ineffective against a person without knowledge of the restriction” (subd. 2). The other shareholders’ tools against a co-owner include the board vote and removal rules above and the court remedies below. Under Minn. Stat. § 302A.341, subd. 2, “An officer may be removed at any time, with or without cause, by a resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors present,” and such a removal “is subject to the provisions of a shareholder control agreement and is without prejudice to any contractual rights of the officer.”
For an LLC, the rules are these:
- Selling. A transfer of a transferable interest “is permissible,” but the transfer “does not entitle the transferee to: (i) participate in the management or conduct of the company’s activities” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0502, subd. 1). The buyer receives the “distributions to which the transferor would otherwise be entitled” (subd. 2). Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0401, subd. 4, a person becomes a member “as provided in the operating agreement,” “with the consent of all the members,” or by the other routes that subdivision lists.
- Walking away. “A person has the power to dissociate as a member at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, by withdrawing as a member by express will under section 322C.0602, clause (1)” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0601, subd. 1). Withdrawing by express will is wrongful if it “occurs before the termination of the company” (subd. 2), and the member “is liable to the limited liability company and, subject to section 322C.0901, to the other members for damages caused by the dissociation” (subd. 3).
- What the leaving member keeps. “A person’s dissociation does not entitle the person to a distribution” (§ 322C.0404, subd. 2). The member’s interest “is owned by the person solely as a transferee” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0603, subd. 1), which keeps the economic rights and ends the vote.
- Expulsion. A member may be “expelled as a member pursuant to the operating agreement” (Minn. Stat. § 322C.0602, clause (3)). Under clause (4), the other members may also expel a member “by the unanimous consent of the other members” on the grounds that clause lists, such as when “there has been a transfer of all of the person’s transferable interest in the company.” Otherwise, “on application by the company,” a court may expel a member who, among other grounds, “has willfully or persistently committed, or is willfully and persistently committing, a material breach of the operating agreement or the person’s duties or obligations under section 322C.0409” (clause (5)).
These rules point an LLC member who wants out toward a negotiated buyout, because withdrawal alone brings damages exposure and no right to a distribution.
What Can a Court Order When Owners Cannot Work It Out?
A Minnesota court can order equitable relief, a buyout at fair value, or dissolution for a corporation on the grounds § 302A.751 lists. For an LLC, it can order dissolution on the grounds Minn. Stat. § 322C.0701 lists, or a remedy other than dissolution where that remedy “would be appropriate under all the facts and circumstances of the case.” In an LLC case claiming that those in control acted illegally, fraudulently, or oppressively, that remedy may include a fair-value sale of a member’s interest. Neither statute requires a shareholder or operating agreement.
For a corporation, Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 1, provides that “A court may grant any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in the circumstances or may dissolve a corporation and liquidate its assets and business.” In a shareholder’s action, the grounds include:
- “the directors or the persons having the authority otherwise vested in the board are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock”
- “the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted fraudulently or illegally toward one or more shareholders” in the capacities the statute names
- “the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation, or as officers or employees of a closely held corporation”
- “the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted”
A closely held corporation “means a corporation which does not have more than 35 shareholders” (Minn. Stat. § 302A.011, subd. 6a). In a shareholder’s action involving a corporation that is not publicly held, once one of the listed grounds “is established, the court may, upon motion of a corporation or a shareholder or beneficial owner of shares of the corporation, order the sale by a plaintiff or a defendant of all shares of the corporation held by the plaintiff or defendant to either the corporation or the moving shareholders, whichever is specified in the motion, if the court determines in its discretion that an order would be fair and equitable to all parties under all of the circumstances of the case” (§ 302A.751, subd. 2). The price is “the fair value of the shares as of the date of the commencement of the action or as of another date found equitable by the court.” If the bylaws or other terms already set a buyout price, the court uses that price and those terms “unless the court determines that the price or terms are unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case.” Before ordering dissolution, “the court shall consider whether lesser relief suggested by one or more parties, such as any form of equitable relief, a buy-out, or a partial liquidation, would be adequate to permanently relieve the circumstances established under subdivision 1, clause (b) or (c)” (subd. 3b). A party that “has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith” can be ordered to pay the other side’s reasonable expenses, including attorney fees (subd. 4). The case must be “brought in a court within the county in which the registered office of the corporation is located” (subd. 5).
For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0701, subd. 1, lets a member apply for dissolution on grounds that include “it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the company’s activities in conformity with the articles of organization and the operating agreement.” A member may also apply on the ground that the managers, governors, or those members in control “have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal or fraudulent” or “have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applicant.” “In a proceeding brought under subdivision 1, clause (5),” which covers both of those grounds, “the court may order a remedy other than dissolution, which may include the sale for fair value of all membership interests a member owns” to the company or other members (subd. 2). The same subdivision adds: “A remedy other than dissolution may be ordered in any case where that remedy would be appropriate under all the facts and circumstances of the case.” Such a proceeding under clause (5) “must be brought in a court within the county in which the registered office of the limited liability company is located” (subd. 3). Conduct is oppressive when it is unfairly prejudicial “because the conduct frustrated an expectation of the applicant member that” meets four conditions, one being that it “is not contrary to the operating agreement as applied consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 322C.0409, subdivision 4” (§ 322C.0102, subd. 18). Conduct “is not oppressive solely by reason of a good faith disagreement as to the content, interpretation, or application of the company’s operating agreement.”
The elements and proof of a shareholder oppression claim, the deadlock remedies available to evenly split owners, and how a court-ordered buyout works each have their own page.
How Do Bylaws, Articles, and the Way Owners Actually Operated Fill the Gaps?
Bylaws, if the company adopted any, change many of the corporate defaults, and a court weighing relief looks at what the owners expected as their relationship developed, including how they actually ran the company. Under Minn. Stat. § 302A.181, subd. 1, “A corporation may, but need not, have bylaws.” Where they exist, “Bylaws may contain any provision relating to the management of the business or the regulation of the affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with section 302A.201 or any other provision of law or the articles.”
Who controls the bylaws matters in a dispute. “Unless reserved by the articles to the shareholders, the power to adopt, amend, or repeal the bylaws is vested in the board” (§ 302A.181, subd. 2). The board’s power has limits: “the board shall not adopt, amend, or repeal a bylaw fixing a quorum for meetings of shareholders, prescribing procedures for removing directors or filling vacancies in the board, or fixing the number of directors or their classifications, qualifications, or terms of office, but may adopt or amend a bylaw to increase the number of directors.” Shareholders “holding three percent or more of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote” may propose bylaw changes of their own, and “the limitations and procedures for submitting, considering, and adopting the resolution are the same as provided in section 302A.135, subdivisions 2 to 4, for amendment of the articles” (subd. 3).
Past practice counts too. In deciding whether to order relief under § 302A.751, subd. 3a, “the court shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other.”
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied that idea in Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. App. 2001), a § 302A.751 case about a closely held corporation decided on summary judgment. The court said shareholders ordinarily expect the controlling shareholders to seek board approval. It then reasoned: “But the circumstances underlying the formation of a close corporation and the shareholders’ practice thereafter may change that expectation and alter the shareholders’ fiduciary duty.” There, “ACP operated informally, without either a budget or corporate bylaws.” The court rejected the board-approval claim on two more grounds. “More important, Gunderson acquiesced in the decisions he claims Jones and Folken made without first obtaining board approval,” and “Gunderson cannot now conveniently premise a claim of unfairly prejudicial conduct on the very practice in which he participated routinely without objection.” The court added: “Even if Gunderson’s claim had a legal basis, it lacks a factual basis.” Elsewhere the court said: “Courts may also look to a course of dealing that implies an agreement.” For a company that never adopted formal rules, the owners’ own practice “may change that expectation” of board approval.
For an older LLC, § 322C.1204, subd. 3, provides that “the language in the articles of organization, and any bylaws, operating agreement, or member control agreement of a limited liability company formed before August 1, 2015, that becomes subject to this chapter will operate as if that language were in the operating agreement of the limited liability company when it becomes subject to this chapter.” An LLC that has a written agreement its members stopped following raises different questions.
How Are Oral Agreements Between Owners Proved and Enforced?
An oral agreement among all the members of an LLC is an operating agreement. In a corporation, the Court of Appeals held in Gunderson that a court may rely on oral agreements in judging what the owners could reasonably expect. Oral promises can count even when they are too indefinite to enforce as a contract. Proof comes from what the owners said, wrote, and did. A lawsuit on the oral deal itself can also face Minnesota’s statute of frauds in Minn. Stat. § 513.01. A contract to buy or sell a corporation’s shares is different: under Minn. Stat. § 336.8-113, it “is enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed,” even if it “is not capable of performance within one year of its making.”
For an LLC, the definition in § 322C.0102, subd. 17, quoted in the first section, reaches an oral or implied agreement of all the members. Under § 322C.0110, subd. 1, “Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions 2 and 3, the operating agreement governs,” so a proved oral deal among every member governs the matters it covers, within the limits of subdivision 3. That subdivision says “An operating agreement may not,” among other things, “unreasonably restrict the duties and rights stated in section 322C.0410” or “vary the power of a court to decree dissolution in the circumstances specified in section 322C.0701, subdivision 1, clauses (4) and (5).” A deal between only some of the members does not meet that definition. A member who joined after the members reached their terms is treated as agreeing to them, because under § 322C.0111, subd. 2, quoted in the first section, a new member “is deemed to assent to the operating agreement.”
For a corporation, Minn. Stat. § 302A.457, subd. 2, makes a written shareholder control agreement “valid and specifically enforceable, if the agreement is signed by all persons who, on the date the agreement first becomes effective, are then the shareholders of the corporation, whether or not the shareholders all have voting shares, and the subscribers for shares, whether or not voting shares, to be issued.” Subdivision 4 adds that the procedure is not “the exclusive method of agreement among shareholders or between the shareholders and the corporation with respect to any of the matters described in this section.” In Gunderson, the Court of Appeals held that “courts may rely on written or oral agreements among shareholders or between shareholders and the corporation in determining whether shareholder expectations are reasonable.” The same court applied Minnesota’s rule that “In the absence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary or sufficient consideration in addition to the services to be rendered, Minnesota law presumes that employment for an indefinite term is at will.” That presumption defeated the shareholder’s contract claim over his job. Yet the alleged promises of job security could still count toward his oppression claim, “even though the promises were insufficiently definite to create a contractual agreement.”
The statute of frauds, § 513.01, provides: “No action shall be maintained, in either of the following cases, upon any agreement, unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, and subscribed by the party charged therewith.” Clause (1) covers “every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.” A contract to buy or sell corporate shares has its own rule. Under § 336.8-113, “A contract or modification of a contract for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year of its making.” Under Minn. Stat. § 336.8-103, paragraph (a), “A share or similar equity interest issued by a corporation, business trust, joint stock company, or similar entity is a security.” An LLC interest is treated differently: under paragraph (c), it “is a general intangible and is not a security or a financial asset, except as follows,” and the exceptions include an interest whose “terms expressly provide that it is a security governed by this article” or that is traded on a securities exchange or market.
I suggest gathering the emails, texts, meeting notes, bank records, and tax filings that show how the owners split money, work, and decisions, because those records are the evidence of an oral or implied deal. A business that was never formed as a corporation or LLC is a separate subject, covered on the page about oral partnership agreements.
What Changes If the Owners Sign an Agreement in the Middle of the Dispute?
A signed agreement can resolve the open questions. A shareholder control agreement and an LLC operating agreement each need every owner, though the control-agreement procedure is not “the exclusive method of agreement among shareholders” (§ 302A.457, subd. 4). A corporation’s written agreements between shareholders, or between shareholders and the corporation, are presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations on the matters they deal with (§ 302A.751, subd. 3a, quoted in item 2 below). A majority alone cannot remove some minority protections. A shareholder agreement signed during a dispute can still be a sound result, as part of a settlement or a standstill while the owners negotiate a buyout.
The rules that apply to a mid-dispute agreement:
- Control and operating agreements need every owner. A corporate control agreement needs the signatures of everyone who is a shareholder when it takes effect (§ 302A.457, subd. 2, quoted in the section on oral agreements), and “A copy of the agreement shall be filed with the corporation.” An LLC operating agreement is by definition the agreement “of all the members” (§ 322C.0102, subd. 17), and in a member-managed LLC “The operating agreement may be amended only with the consent of all members” (§ 322C.0407, subd. 2). In a manager-managed or board-managed LLC, subdivisions 3 and 4 also provide that “The consent of all members is required to . . . amend the operating agreement.”
- The writing becomes the record of expectations. In a corporation, “any written agreements, including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements, between or among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders and the corporation are presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements” (§ 302A.751, subd. 3a). Gunderson adds that “written agreements are not dispositive of shareholder expectations in all circumstances.” In an LLC, an expectation is protected from oppression only if, among other conditions, it is not contrary to the operating agreement. That test applies the agreement consistently with the good-faith obligation in § 322C.0409, subd. 4 (§ 322C.0102, subd. 18, quoted in the court section).
- New transfer limits need the holder’s consent. Under § 302A.429, subd. 1, a provision quoted in the section on owners leaving, a new transfer restriction does not bind shares issued before it unless their holders signed the agreement or voted for it.
- Some protections resist a majority. An amendment that limits cumulative voting fails “if the votes of a proportion of the voting power sufficient to elect a director at an election of the entire board under cumulative voting are cast against the amendment” (§ 302A.215, subd. 3). The limits on the board’s power over bylaws, quoted in the bylaws section, bind the board, and “The power of the board is subject to the power of the shareholders, exercisable in the manner provided in subdivision 3, to adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws adopted, amended, or repealed by the board” (§ 302A.181, subd. 2).
I suggest reading each proposed term against the claims you may still want to bring, because the signed document will shape those claims.
What Are the Options for Resolving the Dispute?
The options run from a direct conversation between the owners, through a negotiated buyout or signed agreement and the statutory tools each owner holds, to a court case, and for an LLC member, withdrawal. Each fits a different situation and carries a different risk. Some steps, such as a written records demand or a shareholder vote, need no court, and mediation brings in a neutral to help price a buyout.
- Owner-to-owner conversation. Fits when the business still works and the disagreement is about money or roles. The risk is a side deal not every owner signs, which may not bind the company or the other owners under §§ 302A.457 and 322C.0102.
- Negotiated buyout or signed agreement. Fits when one owner wants out or the owners want rules going forward. The risk is price: with no agreed formula, each side’s value number is a starting position, and a shareholder control agreement or LLC operating agreement needs every owner (see the section on signing mid-dispute).
- Records demand first. Fits when one owner controls the books. A written demand under § 302A.461 or § 322C.0410 shows what the company earns and can afford before anyone makes an offer. The risk is that a formal demand signals a dispute to the other side.
- Use the vote. Fits a corporation where cumulative voting or a removal vote can change the board under §§ 302A.215 and 302A.223. Unless the articles, the bylaws, or a control agreement modify them, “regular meetings of shareholders need not be held, unless demanded by a shareholder under certain conditions (section 302A.431),” and “directors serve for an indefinite term that expires at the next regular meeting of shareholders (section 302A.207)” (§ 302A.111, subd. 3). The demand procedure is in Minn. Stat. § 302A.431, subd. 2. The risk is that a contested meeting hardens positions.
- Mediation. Fits owners who want a neutral to help price a buyout without a lawsuit. The risk is time and fees with no binding result unless the owners sign one.
- Court petition. Fits when the facts meet one of the grounds listed in the court section. Those include control used against a co-owner, and directors deadlocked in managing the company when the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock (the first ground quoted in the court section, § 302A.751, subd. 1). The court has broad options under § 302A.751 and § 322C.0701. It orders a corporate buyout only “if the court determines in its discretion” that one is fair, and § 302A.751, subd. 4, lets it award expenses against a party that “has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith.”
- LLC withdrawal. Fits rarely. Under § 322C.0601, withdrawal before termination is wrongful, carries damages, and under § 322C.0404, subd. 2, brings no distribution.
I suggest starting with a written records request and a direct conversation, because together they test whether a negotiated buyout is possible.
Can one of two equal LLC members make a company decision alone?
Not under the default rules of a member-managed Minnesota LLC with no operating agreement saying otherwise. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0407, subd. 2, an ordinary-course difference “may be decided by a majority of the members,” and one of two members is not a majority. An act outside the ordinary course “may be undertaken only with the consent of all members.” For an LLC formed before August 1, 2015, Minn. Stat. § 322C.1204, subd. 3, subject to the operating agreement, sets each membership interest’s voting power “in proportion to the value of the contributions of the members reflected in the records required by item (i).”
Can the majority shareholder remove me from the board?
Yes, by default, unless cumulative voting protects your seat. Under Minn. Stat. § 302A.223, subd. 3, directors “may be removed at any time, with or without cause,” by “a majority of the voting power of all shares entitled to vote at an election of directors.” In a corporation with cumulative voting, unless the entire board is removed at once, subdivision 4 keeps you on the board if enough votes to elect you are cast against your removal. A director elected solely by one class or series of shares may be removed only by that class or series. The articles, the bylaws, or a shareholder control agreement may change these rules.
Is my co-owner's handshake deal binding without a signed agreement?
It can be, and the answer differs by entity. For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0102, subd. 17, counts an oral or implied agreement of all the members as an operating agreement. For a corporation, Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. App. 2001), held that “courts may rely on written or oral agreements among shareholders or between shareholders and the corporation in determining whether shareholder expectations are reasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 513.01 bars a lawsuit on “every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof” unless the agreement “or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, and subscribed by the party charged therewith.” A contract to buy or sell a corporation’s shares is different: under Minn. Stat. § 336.8-113, it “is enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed,” even if it “is not capable of performance within one year of its making.”
Will a court look at a draft agreement nobody signed?
It can, and the answer differs by entity. For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0102, subd. 17, counts the agreement of all the members “whether oral, in a record, implied, or in any combination thereof” as the operating agreement, so a draft every member agreed to can govern even unsigned. For a corporation, the presumption in Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subd. 3a, covers “any written agreements” between or among shareholders, or between one or more shareholders and the corporation. It presumes they reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations on the matters they deal with, and a draft the owners never agreed to is not an agreement. In Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Professionals, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. App. 2001), the court held an expectation based on a business plan unreasonable “because the shareholders never adopted the plan or even learned of it.” The same opinion said, about a shareholder’s job, that “to be reasonable, an expectation of continuing employment must be known and accepted by other shareholders.”
Owner Disputes Without a Written Agreement
With no signed shareholder or operating agreement, Chapter 302A or Chapter 322C decides a Minnesota owner dispute, along with the articles and any bylaws. Any oral or implied deal the owners can prove, and the way they actually ran the business, also count. Knowing which default applies to your company tells you who holds the vote, who gets paid, and what a court can order if talks fail. The practice page on business partner dispute matters describes how I handle these cases.
For help with a dispute like this, email [email protected] with a brief description, and I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.