If you left a Minnesota company and your deferred compensation has not been paid, the plan document decides how you collect it. When the plan is an ERISA “top-hat” plan for executives, you file a written claim with the plan and appeal any denial inside the plan. Then you can sue for the benefits in state or federal court. When the deferred pay is a bonus promise outside any ERISA plan, it is a contract claim. Minnesota’s final-pay statutes can add a deadline for payment, and Minnesota’s wage-claim statute, Minn. Stat. § 541.07, rather than the general contract statute, applies to a suit for it.
This page is written for a former executive whose salary deferrals, supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) benefit, or deferred bonus has not been paid. Most of the law here is federal. For a plan it covers, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) governs the claim, the appeal, and the lawsuit. An unfunded SERP kept solely to pay benefits above the tax code’s section 415 limits is outside those rules, as What Decides Whether ERISA Governs Your Deferred Compensation Plan? explains. The Eighth Circuit, the federal appeals court for Minnesota, has decided how courts review a top-hat plan’s denial. Minnesota statutes reach the deferred bonus that is outside any ERISA plan and the noncompete question. If your unpaid pay is stock or options instead, my page on what happens to unvested stock when you get laid off covers it, and my other Minnesota employment law pages cover the employer’s side.
What Decides Whether ERISA Governs Your Deferred Compensation Plan?
The plan’s terms and the facts around it decide. A plan that pays deferred compensation when your employment ends can be an ERISA pension plan, and one limited to a select group of executives can be a top-hat plan. Subject to the exceptions in its subparagraph (B), ERISA’s definition reaches a plan that, “by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances,” “results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond,” under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). A top-hat plan is “a plan which is unfunded and is maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees,” in the words of 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2). One kind of SERP falls outside ERISA’s title I entirely. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), “The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if” (among other cases) “such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(36) of this title) and is unfunded.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36) defines that as “a plan maintained by an employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by section 415 of title 26 on plans to which that section applies without regard to whether the plan is funded.” That subchapter holds ERISA’s claims procedure in § 1133, its right to sue in § 1132, and its preemption rule in § 1144(a), quoted in the next paragraph, which excludes plans exempt under § 1003(b).
That classification changes which rules apply. A top-hat plan is exempt from ERISA’s vesting rules in § 1051(2), its funding rules in 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3), and its fiduciary rules in 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1). It keeps ERISA’s claims procedure and its right to sue. With exceptions listed in subsection (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.” A bonus deferred to a date while you still work for the company may fall outside ERISA; my page on phantom equity explains the regulation that draws that line.
How Do You File a Claim for Unpaid Deferred Compensation?
You file a written claim under the plan’s own claims procedure, which federal law requires every ERISA plan to have. Under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b), “Every employee benefit plan shall establish and maintain reasonable procedures governing the filing of benefit claims, notification of benefit determinations, and appeal of adverse benefit determinations.” The plan document or its summary names who receives claims, which can be a committee or the company itself acting as plan administrator.
Hankins v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC, 129 F.4th 1088 (8th Cir. 2025) shows the sequence. A former chief operating officer resigned and sought his vested deferred compensation. The plan called for an initial determination, then a written claim, then an appeal, and then suit after the appeal was denied. When the company did not pay by the plan’s payment deadline, the parties agreed to treat the missed deadline as the initial determination, and the executive then filed his written claim.
The regulation sets the plan’s response time. For a claim other than a group health or disability claim, if the claim is denied, the plan must give notice “within a reasonable period of time, but not later than 90 days after receipt of the claim by the plan, unless the plan administrator determines that special circumstances require an extension of time for processing the claim,” under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(1). Before that first period ends, the plan must give you written notice of any extension and the reason for it, and “In no event shall such extension exceed a period of 90 days from the end of such initial period.” A denial must state, among other items, “The specific reason or reasons for the adverse determination”; a “Reference to the specific plan provisions on which the determination is based”; “A description of any additional material or information necessary for the claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary”; and “A description of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits applicable to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s right to bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following an adverse benefit determination on review,” under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(1).
How Does the Appeal of a Denied Claim Work?
After a denial, you appeal inside the plan, and the appeal is your chance to put evidence in front of the decision maker before a court reviews the denial. ERISA requires a plan to give “adequate notice in writing” of a denial, “setting forth the specific reasons for such denial,” and to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim,” under 29 U.S.C. § 1133. The claims regulation sets the minimum terms of that review.
Under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2), a plan’s procedure must:
- Allow time to appeal. “Provide claimants at least 60 days following receipt of a notification of an adverse benefit determination within which to appeal the determination.” A plan may allow more, so the plan document and the denial letter state your actual window. Check the current text of the regulation before relying on these periods.
- Accept your evidence. “Provide claimants the opportunity to submit written comments, documents, records, and other information relating to the claim for benefits.”
- Consider all of it. The review must take into account everything you submit, whether or not the first decision considered it.
The plan then must decide the appeal “within a reasonable period of time, but not later than 60 days after receipt of the claimant’s request for review by the plan,” under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1)(i), unless special circumstances require an extension, and “In no event shall such extension exceed a period of 60 days from the end of the initial period.” That rule applies “Except as provided in paragraphs (i)(1)(ii), (i)(2), and (i)(3) of this section,” and the last two cover group health and disability claims. Under (i)(1)(ii), a plan whose committee or board of trustees is the named fiduciary and “holds regularly scheduled meetings at least quarterly” must instead decide “no later than the date of the meeting of the committee or board that immediately follows the plan’s receipt of a request for review, unless the request for review is filed within 30 days preceding the date of such meeting.” In that case, “a benefit determination may be made by no later than the date of the second meeting following the plan’s receipt of the request for review,” and special circumstances can extend it to the third meeting. Check the current text of 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(i)(1) before relying on these periods.
In Hankins, the district court “granted judgment on the administrative record,” and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. I suggest putting every document and every argument into the appeal, including your reading of each plan term the company relied on. The regulation requires the review to take into account everything you submit, and the courts in Hankins decided the case on that administrative record.
When Can You Sue Your Former Employer for Deferred Compensation?
You can sue for benefits under ERISA after you use the plan’s review procedure, if the plan has one, unless an exception such as futility applies. In Wert v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, Inc., 447 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit held “that exhaustion of contractual remedies is required” in a suit over denied ERISA benefits “when there is available to a claimant a contractual review procedure.” The procedure must comply with § 1133 and with the claims regulation’s rules on decision timing and denial notices.
The court added that the requirement “applies so long as the employee has notice of the procedure,” even when the documents do not call the review mandatory. In Yates v. Symetra Life Insurance Co., 60 F.4th 1109 (8th Cir. 2023), the Eighth Circuit said “Wert also does not address the issue here,” a plan whose written documents set out no review procedure, and held: “A participant in an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before challenging a denial of benefits in court when the written plan documents make no mention of any review process or administrative remedies that can be exhausted.” Yates also repeated the circuit’s exceptions, quoting an earlier decision: “[w]e excuse the exhaustion requirement only when pursuing an administrative remedy would be futile or there is no administrative remedy to pursue.”
The lawsuit itself is brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which lets a participant sue “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” Under § 1132(e)(1), “State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions under paragraphs (1)(B) and (7) of subsection (a) of this section.” The former executive in Hankins brought his claim under this provision, and his case was heard in federal court as a claim for the benefits the plan promised.
ERISA sets no deadline of its own for this suit. In Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that “ERISA does not, however, specify a statute of limitations for filing suit” under this provision, and it reported that the district court there “explained that the limitations period provided by the most nearly analogous state statute applies.” The same decision held that a plan can set its own period for suit, “as long as the period is reasonable,” and it noted that the administrator’s conduct may, through waiver or estoppel, prevent the administrator from relying on that period.
For a Minnesota claim, the Eighth Circuit has borrowed a Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. § 541.07. In Adamson v. Armco, Inc., 44 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), a suit for benefits from unfunded plans that had stopped paying, it agreed “that § 541.07(5) is the most analogous Minnesota statute of limitations for appellants’ claims under § 502(a)(1)(B),” and it held those claims time-barred. Section 541.07 provides: “Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 541.05, 541.073, 541.076, or 604.205 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years,” and clause (5) lists an action “for the recovery of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties accruing under any federal or state law respecting the payment of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties except, that if the employer fails to submit payroll records by a specified date upon request of the Department of Labor and Industry or if the nonpayment is willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence, the limitation is three years.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on these periods. In Heimeshoff, the Supreme Court noted that “The courts of appeals have uniformly required that participants exhaust internal review before bringing a claim for judicial review under § 502(a)(1)(B),” and it wrote: “A participant’s cause of action under ERISA accordingly does not accrue until the plan issues a final denial.” In Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trades Pension Plan, 223 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2000), the court wrote that a claim for plan benefits “accrues after a plan fiduciary has formally denied an applicant’s claim for benefits or” (quoting an earlier decision) “when there has been a repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiary.” In Adamson, the claims “accrued when the plans were terminated and ceased paying benefits.”
What Standard Does a Court Apply to a Top-Hat Plan Denial?
In Minnesota’s federal courts, a judge reviews a top-hat plan’s denial de novo rather than for abuse of discretion. When the plan gives the administrator discretion to interpret it, the judge still asks whether the company’s reading was reasonable. The Eighth Circuit set that rule in Craig v. Pillsbury Non-Qualified Pension Plan, 458 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2006), a Minnesota executive’s case. The court agreed with the Third Circuit, which had reasoned that “a top hat administrator has no fiduciary responsibilities” under ERISA, and applied de novo review to the plan. It added: “The fact that we conduct a de novo review does not, however, alter our analysis as much as it might appear at first blush,” and “we must determine whether the Plan’s decision was reasonable.”
A discretion clause still matters as a term of the contract. Craig read it under contract principles, which, as the court quoted the Third Circuit, include “the duty to exercise the discretion reasonably.” Hankins applied the same rule in 2025: the reasons that support deferential review “are simply not present in the case of a top hat plan,” the court said, quoting Craig, and “In effect, we review Crain’s interpretations for reasonableness.”
Both cases treat the plan as a contract the executive accepted by working. Hankins stated that “top hat plans are unilateral contracts,” and it applied a test drawn from an earlier Eighth Circuit decision: an interpretation is not reasonable if it ignores qualifying language or contravenes the plain language of the plan documents. In Craig, the administrator could resolve an ambiguity in the plan, but it could not redefine “Compensation” to leave out bonuses the plan defined as compensation.
How Are Forfeiture-for-Cause Terms Read in a Top-Hat Plan?
A top-hat plan can take away even a vested benefit if its terms say so, because ERISA’s vesting rules do not apply to it under § 1051(2). A dispute turns on what the plan’s forfeiture term says and whether the company’s reading of it is reasonable. The plan in Hankins provided that “the termination of Employee by the Employer for Cause shall exclude Employee from receipt of any benefits under this Plan,” and it ended payments if the executive breached covenants in two agreements that had never been signed.
The Eighth Circuit read the covenant-breach clause, not the for-cause sentence, by its plain words. That clause provided that the executive’s rights “immediately cease” if he “breaches the covenants set forth in the Employment Agreement and Confidentiality, Noncompete, and Nonsolicitation Agreement.” The court held it “operated as a condition subsequent,” a condition that would have cut off benefits only if the agreements were later created and breached, and it held that “Crain’s interpretation of Article 4 was unreasonable.” The executive had resigned, and the company had raised misconduct during the appeal; the district court found the misconduct claims unsubstantiated, and the company abandoned that argument on appeal. The court refused to let evidence outside the plan change its meaning: “extrinsic evidence cannot create ambiguity in the face of a contract’s plain language.”
Craig adds a limit that matters for a cause term. The court held that the administrator “could not give ‘Compensation’ a ‘double-secret’ meaning after the fact and without notice,” borrowing the Ninth Circuit’s phrase from a case about the meaning of “cause” in a stock option plan. I suggest reading the plan’s own definition of cause, and any agreement it brings in by reference, before answering a cause denial, because Hankins and Craig test the company’s reading against those words. My page on phantom equity describes a case where a jury rejected a board’s for-cause finding.
What Happens to a Forfeiture for Competing Under a Top-Hat Plan?
A top-hat plan can include a term that cancels unpaid benefits if you compete, and federal law may let the company enforce it even if state law would not. The Iowa Supreme Court, applying federal law in Lindsay v. Cottingham & Butler Insurance Services, Inc., 763 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 2009), reasoned that “ERISA’s failure to protect top hat plans from the forfeiture provisions contained in those plans allows a top hat plan to include enforceable noncompete forfeiture provisions even if these provisions are not enforceable under state law.” That decision persuades but does not bind a Minnesota court, and it did not decide whether Iowa law would have invalidated the term.
Minnesota’s noncompete statute is written in terms of restrictions on work. Under Minn. Stat. § 181.988, subd. 2, “Any covenant not to compete contained in a contract or agreement is void and unenforceable.” The ban reaches only newer agreements. Laws 2023, ch. 53, art. 6, § 1, the session law enacting it, provides, “This section is effective July 1, 2023, and applies to contracts and agreements entered into on or after that date.” Subdivision 1 defines a covenant not to compete as “an agreement between an employee and employer that restricts the employee, after termination of the employment, from performing” work for another employer for a specified period, work in a specified geographical area, or work for another employer in a similar capacity. It “does not include a nondisclosure agreement, or agreement designed to protect trade secrets or confidential information,” and it “does not include a nonsolicitation agreement.” Subdivision 2(b) opens “Notwithstanding paragraph (a).” Under it, a covenant “is valid and enforceable” if it is agreed upon during the sale of a business, as a “temporary and geographically restricted covenant” limited to “a reasonable geographic area” and “a reasonable length of time.” The same is true of a covenant agreed upon in anticipation of a business’s dissolution, limited to “a reasonable geographic area where the business has been transacted.” The statute’s text does not mention a forfeiture of deferred pay. My research did not identify a Minnesota or Eighth Circuit decision on whether that ban reaches a forfeiture-for-competing term in an ERISA top-hat plan. The answer may turn on how a court applies § 1144(a) to your plan. My page on phantom equity covers the Minnesota Supreme Court’s earlier treatment of a forfeiture for competing as a restraint of trade.
Why Does Unfunded Status Matter if the Company Cannot Pay?
A top-hat plan is unfunded, so the company pays it from its own general assets, and you have no claim on those assets ahead of the company’s other unsecured creditors. The Department of Labor’s reporting rule for these plans describes benefits that “are paid as needed solely from the general assets of the employer,” or through insurance contracts the employer pays for, under 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23(d).
A trust set up to pay the plan did not change that result in a case where the trust’s own document made its assets subject to the company’s creditors’ claims. In In re IT Group, Inc., 448 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2006), a decision from another circuit that persuades but does not bind a Minnesota court, the court held that “even if the Trust were funded, Participants’ legal rights to its assets, and to the assets of the Corporation as a whole, are no greater than those of the Corporation’s general, unsecured creditors.” It relied on that trust’s terms: “the Trust document unequivocally establishes that Trust assets are subject to creditors’ claims in the event of insolvency.” I suggest weighing the company’s finances when you decide how hard and how fast to press a claim, because a judgment can collect only what the company can pay.
What If Your Deferred Bonus Is Not Part of an ERISA Plan?
A bonus promise that is not an ERISA plan is enforced as a contract claim, and Minnesota’s final-pay statutes can set when earned pay is due. Minnesota’s wage-claim statute, Minn. Stat. § 541.07, applies to a suit for it. Each of the final-pay statutes reaches only wages or commissions that were earned and unpaid. Clause (5) of § 541.07 defines wages to include “commissions and bonuses,” and When Can You Sue Your Former Employer for Deferred Compensation? quotes the statute in full. My page on a bonus dispute covers when a bonus becomes a binding promise, and my page on the transaction bonus covers payouts tied to a sale of the company.
Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011) was a physician’s suit for breach of contract and promissory estoppel over pay. There, the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote of § 541.07(5) that it has “consistently applied this statute of limitations period whenever” (quoting an earlier decision) “the gravamen of the action is the breach of an employment contract.” On when such a claim accrues, the court wrote: “If, for example, the wrongful conduct is the failure to pay wages, a cause of action accrues with each failure to pay wages earned.” It distinguished cases “in which an employer has a continuing contractual or statutory obligation to pay wages or other benefits that gives rise to a new cause of action each time there is an improper payment.” Reviewing a dismissal on the complaint’s allegations, the court found that the employer had refused to honor a policy exempting long-serving physicians from night call without a salary reduction, and that the benefit was “an obligation owed to Hamann in April 2005, when Hamann demanded performance.” It held that his claims accrued then, and that the later salary reduction “was a consequence of the wrongful conduct but it is not the wrong for which Hamann seeks redress.” The court reversed a 2010 court of appeals decision that had treated each pay period as a separate breach.
The two final-pay statutes split by how employment ended. After a discharge, Minn. Stat. § 181.13 provides that “the wages or commissions actually earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable upon demand of the employee.” After a resignation, Minn. Stat. § 181.14, subd. 1, requires that “the wages or commissions earned and unpaid at the time the employee quits or resigns shall be paid in full not later than the first regularly scheduled payday following the employee’s final day of employment, unless an employee is subject to a collective bargaining agreement with a different provision.” The same paragraph adds: “If the first regularly scheduled payday is less than five calendar days following the employee’s final day of employment, full payment may be delayed until the second regularly scheduled payday but shall not exceed a total of 20 calendar days following the employee’s final day of employment.”
A demand starts a short clock under both statutes, and under each, “An employee’s demand for payment under this section must be in writing but need not state the precise amount of unpaid wages or commissions.” After a discharge, § 181.13 puts the employer in default if earned pay is “not paid within 24 hours after demand.” After a resignation, § 181.14, subd. 2, provides that “Wages or commissions not paid within the required time period shall become immediately payable upon the demand of the employee.” Section 181.14, subd. 4, changes the timing where “the discharged or quitting employee was, during employment, entrusted with the collection, disbursement, or handling of money or property, the employer shall have ten calendar days after the termination of the employment to audit and adjust the accounts of the employee before the employee’s wages or commissions shall be paid as provided in this section, and the penalty herein provided shall apply in such case only from the date of demand made after the expiration of the period allowed for payment of the employee’s wages or commissions.” My page on when Minnesota final pay is due explains the written demand and the penalty.
What Are Your Options When the Company Will Not Pay?
You can raise the payment directly with the company’s leaders, press the plan’s claim and appeal, negotiate a settlement, or sue after the appeal, and each fits a different situation. You can pursue more than one at a time.
- A direct conversation. Talking with the CEO or the board chair can fit when the delay looks like cash flow or a misunderstanding of the plan. It costs nothing, but it does not stop the plan’s own deadlines, so I suggest following up in writing.
- The plan’s claim and appeal. Under Wert, an ERISA plan’s review procedure must be used before suit, unless an exception such as futility applies. It builds the record a court will read, and it costs your time and the cost of help preparing it.
- A negotiated settlement. A company short on cash may offer less now or a payment schedule. The unsecured-creditor risk in IT Group is the reason to weigh a smaller certain payment against a larger uncertain one.
- A lawsuit for benefits. After the appeal, a suit under § 1132(a)(1)(B), in state or federal court, puts the plan’s terms before a judge. In Minnesota’s federal courts, which follow the Eighth Circuit, Craig calls for de novo review of a top-hat plan’s denial, and when the plan grants discretion, the judge asks whether the company’s reading was reasonable. It adds litigation cost and time.
A late payment, or a payment made under a settlement, can raise a federal tax question under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code, which governs nonqualified deferred compensation plans. The Treasury regulation addresses it in 26 C.F.R. § 1.409A-3(g), a paragraph titled “Disputed payments and refusals to pay.” It provides that “efforts to collect the payment will be presumed not to be prompt, reasonable, good faith efforts, unless the service provider provides notice to the service recipient within 90 days of the latest date upon which the payment could have been timely made in accordance with the terms of the plan and these regulations, and unless, if not paid, the service provider takes further enforcement measures within 180 days after such latest date.” Check the current text of 26 C.F.R. § 1.409A-3(g) before relying on these periods. I suggest having your tax adviser read it with you once a payment is missed, because its treatment depends on steps you take and when you take them. If you are weighing these choices alongside a separation agreement, my page for the executive employment attorney work covers the rest of an executive’s exit.
Can I get a copy of the plan and the company's file on my claim?
Yes, for the documents that bear on your claim. The federal claims regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(2)(iii), requires a plan’s appeal procedure to give a claimant, “upon request and free of charge, reasonable access to, and copies of, all documents, records, and other information relevant to the claimant’s claim for benefits.” I suggest asking in writing before you file the appeal, because the appeal is your chance to answer what the file says.
What if the company never answers my claim or my appeal?
You may be able to sue without waiting longer. Under 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(l)(1), when a plan fails to establish or follow claims procedures consistent with the regulation, “a claimant shall be deemed to have exhausted the administrative remedies available under the plan.” In Hankins v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC, 129 F.4th 1088 (8th Cir. 2025), the executive appealed again, the company did not respond, and he sued. In Yates v. Symetra Life Insurance Co., 60 F.4th 1109 (8th Cir. 2023), the Eighth Circuit left open when procedures written into the plan documents are deemed exhausted for that reason.
Does a deadline in the plan limit when I can sue?
It can. In Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held: “Absent a controlling statute to the contrary, a participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” The Court added: “If the administrator’s conduct causes a participant to miss the deadline for judicial review, waiver or estoppel may prevent the administrator from invoking the limitations provision as a defense.” If the plan sets no period, the Eighth Circuit has borrowed Minn. Stat. § 541.07, quoted under When Can You Sue Your Former Employer for Deferred Compensation?. I suggest reading the plan for its own period as soon as payment stops, because that period can run during the appeal.
Can I recover my attorney fees if I win?
For a suit over an ERISA plan, you can ask the court for them, and the award is discretionary. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), in an action under that part of ERISA, “the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” In Hankins v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC, 129 F.4th 1088 (8th Cir. 2025), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a fee award to a former executive. The company there raised its objections only after he sought payment, and it then adopted an unreasonable reading of the plan. For a bonus outside any ERISA plan, in a suit under Minn. Stat. § 181.171, subd. 1, for a violation of § 181.13 or § 181.14, subdivision 3 provides that “the court shall order an employer who is found to have committed a violation to pay to the aggrieved party reasonable costs, disbursements, witness fees, and attorney fees.”
Does it matter that my plan says another state's law governs?
For an ERISA plan, the Eighth Circuit has held that the choice does not control. In Hankins v. Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC, 129 F.4th 1088 (8th Cir. 2025), the plan chose Arkansas law, and the court applied federal common law instead because “parties may not contract to choose state law as the governing law of an ERISA-governed benefit plan,” quoting an earlier Eighth Circuit decision. Under that federal law, the court gave the plan’s words their plain and ordinary meaning.
Collecting Deferred Compensation After You Leave
An unpaid top-hat plan benefit is collected through the plan’s written claim and appeal, and then a suit for benefits in state or federal court. In Minnesota’s federal courts, the judge reviews the denial de novo, but when the plan grants the company discretion, the judge asks whether the company’s reading was reasonable. The plan document sets the claim steps and any forfeiture term. Whether a suit is timely turns on the plan’s own terms and on Minn. Stat. § 541.07, which the Eighth Circuit has borrowed. When Can You Sue Your Former Employer for Deferred Compensation? sets out both. An unfunded promise is only as good as the company’s finances. A deferred bonus outside ERISA is a contract claim with Minnesota’s final-pay statutes behind it, and Minnesota’s wage-claim statute, § 541.07, applies to a suit for it. My Minnesota employment law pages cover the related rules. If your former employer has not paid deferred compensation and you want to know where your claim stands, email me at [email protected] with a brief description. I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.