A former owner you bought out can still sue you over the deal. The claims can rest on the purchase agreement and any promissory note, on an earn-out, or on what the remaining owners said or held back before closing. A signed release is a defense. The Minnesota Supreme Court has let a claim that fraud induced a release go to trial. In 2025 it held that a motion to dismiss based on a release may be granted only if the complaint’s own allegations, read in the former owner’s favor, “establish an unrebuttable defense.” In Minnesota these questions are answered mostly by court decisions on contracts, releases, and fraud. A few statutes add the deadlines to sue, a securities claim a seller can bring against a buyer, and the duties among owners. Statutes also set company indemnification, on stated conditions, of a person sued because of an official role with the company.

This page is for the remaining owners of a Minnesota corporation or LLC who bought out a co-owner, personally or through the company, and now face a shareholder dispute with that former owner. It assumes the buyout has closed. How the buyout itself is priced and structured is covered in how a Minnesota co-owner buyout works.

What Claims Can a Former Owner Bring After a Minnesota Buyout?

A former owner can sue for breach of the purchase agreement or note, for bad-faith handling of an earn-out, or for fraud. A former owner can also claim breach of a duty to disclose and, when the interest bought was a security, a violation of the Minnesota Securities Act. Each claim has its own elements and deadlines:

  1. Breach of the purchase agreement or note. An unpaid installment, a disputed working-capital adjustment, or a broken covenant is a contract claim decided on the agreement’s words.
  2. Earn-out claims. In In re Hennepin County 1986 Recycling Bond Litigation, 540 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. 1995), the Minnesota Supreme Court described an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. Quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision, it said the covenant requires “that one party not ‘unjustifiably hinder’ the other party’s performance of the contract.” It added that the covenant “does not extend to actions beyond the scope of the underlying contract.” A seller claiming the buyers ran the business to defeat an earn-out relies on this covenant.
  3. Fraud. The former owner claims a false statement of fact induced the sale.
  4. Breach of a disclosure duty. In a closely held corporation, the claim is that the buyers withheld material information, such as a pending offer for the company.
  5. Minnesota Securities Act. Under Minn. Stat. § 80A.76(c), “A person is liable to the seller if the person buys a security by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which it is made, not misleading, the seller not knowing of the untruth or omission, and the purchaser not sustaining the burden of proof that the purchaser did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of the untruth or omission.”

Minn. Stat. § 80A.41(30) defines a security to include “stock,” and clause (D) includes an LLC interest as an investment contract. Subsection (g)(1) of § 80A.76 also makes “a person that directly or indirectly controls a person liable” liable “jointly and severally with and to the same extent as” the buyer, unless that person proves the person “did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,” of the conduct. The seller-side view of earn-outs is in how earnouts work in a Minnesota business sale.

How Does the Buyout Release Affect the Former Owner’s Claims?

A release signed at closing is a defense to the claims it covers, and Minnesota law presumes the parties meant what the signed release says. In Sorensen v. Coast-to-Coast Stores (Central Organization), Inc., 353 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. App. 1984), the Court of Appeals said “A valid release is a defense to any action on the claims released.” It also said “the law presumes that parties to a release agreement intend what is expressed in a signed writing.” The court treated fraud as one of five factors bearing on whether the franchisee intended the release, and on that factor it said “the fraud or misrepresentation must touch execution of the release.” The franchisee argued “that defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct during operation of the store undermines the release’s validity,” and the court enforced the release. In the 2024 decision discussed next, which the Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed, the Court of Appeals applied that factor but said in a footnote, “We question whether Sorensen’s five-factor analysis is appropriate here,” because “each of the five factors from Sorensen involves parol evidence” and “only when contract language is ambiguous may parol evidence ‘be considered to determine intent.’”

A recent case shows how a release defense fares at the start of a suit. In Hoskin v. Krsnak, No. A23-1275 (Minn. Sept. 10, 2025), a member transferred his LLC interests by signing five agreements, each with a release of claims related to the company. He later sued on ten counts, alleging that he signed under duress and because of fraud. The district court dismissed the whole complaint on the releases, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a nonprecedential 2024 opinion. That opinion quotes the releases as covering claims “whether known or unknown.” The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. It held that “a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense may be granted only if the allegations in the complaint, construed in the plaintiff’s favor, establish an unrebuttable defense,” and said “Although we may consider the releases, their mere existence is insufficient to bar Hoskin’s complaint.” The complaint survived because it “does not concede that the releases were executed voluntarily.” On duress, the court said “we have never held that ’economic duress’ cannot constitute an ‘unlawful threat.’” It added, “We express no view on the ultimate merits of Krsnak and JT Manager’s affirmative defense based on release or on Hoskin’s defenses to that affirmative defense.” On remand, in Hoskin v. Krsnak, No. A23-1275 (Minn. App. June 1, 2026), a nonprecedential opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of nine of the ten counts.

I suggest reading which claims, which people, and which documents the release covers, and what it excludes, because its own words set its reach. The release in Hoskin excluded certain indemnification obligations owed to the seller. If the former owner was also an employee and the release reached employment claims, Minn. Stat. § 363A.31 and the federal 29 U.S.C. § 626 add their own requirements, covered in the questions below. Drafting points for these clauses are in releases that waive unknown claims and founder separation and release agreements.

When Can a Fraud Claim Get Past the Release?

A former owner can attack a release by proving that fraud induced the release itself, and a standard “no reliance” or “entire agreement” clause does not end that claim by itself. In Hoyt Properties, Inc. v. Production Resource Group, L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007), a landlord released a tenant’s parent company in a settlement after the parent’s attorney said “PRG and Entolo are totally separate.” The landlord later sued, alleging the release “was induced by a material fraudulent misrepresentation.” The Minnesota Supreme Court sent the claim to trial. It held the statements actionable and said “a party can reasonably rely on a representation unless the falsity of the representation is known or obvious to the listener.”

The Court of Appeals then addressed the contract clauses buyers rely on. In Great Plains Educational Foundation, Inc. v. Student Loan Finance Corp., 954 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. App. 2020), the parties had settled a suit on a $13.25 million promissory note given for stock. The court held that “The presence of both a no-reliance and an integration clause in a settlement agreement does not as a matter of law bar a subsequent claim for fraudulent inducement of that settlement agreement based on alleged oral misrepresentations unless there are express terms in the settlement agreement that contradict the alleged oral misrepresentations.” It said “The Minnesota Supreme Court has long held that fraud cannot be waived by a contractual disclaimer.” Quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision, it added that a defrauded party “may elect to rescind the contract or sue for damages.”

Two limits help the remaining owners. First, the reliance must be reasonable. In Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 2009), where the parties were “sophisticated business equals operating in a commercial setting,” the Minnesota Supreme Court said “When a party conducts an independent factual investigation before it enters into a commercial transaction, that party cannot later claim that it reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentation.” Second, the statement must be one of fact: the first element of fraud, as Hoyt states it quoting an earlier decision, is “a false representation by a party of a past or existing material fact susceptible of knowledge.” A promise can still support a fraud claim on one condition. In Valspar, the court, quoting an earlier decision of its own, said “It is true that a misrepresentation of a present intention could amount to fraud. However, it must be made affirmatively to appear that the promisor had no intention to perform at the time the promise was made.” The elements of a business fraud claim are covered in what a business must prove to win a fraud claim.

The Minnesota Securities Act has its own rule on waivers. Under § 80A.76(l), “A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person purchasing or selling a security or receiving investment advice to waive compliance with this chapter or a rule adopted or order issued under this chapter is void.”

What Did the Remaining Owners Owe the Departing Owner Before Closing?

In a closely held Minnesota corporation, the owners owe one another a fiduciary duty that includes disclosing material information, and a buyout made while hiding a material fact can support a claim after closing. In Berreman v. West Publishing Co., 615 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. App. 2000), a retiring employee whose stock the company redeemed at book value sued after the company sold for about five times that price. Treating the company as a close corporation for purposes of the summary judgment appeal, the court said “we conclude that the fiduciary duties of shareholders in a close corporation include the duty to disclose material information about the corporation.” It still ruled for the company. When it redeemed his stock, three directors had hired an investment bank to study the company’s options, but the company “had made no decision to solicit bids for the sale of West, much less initiated discussions with any potential buyers.” Those facts were “immaterial as a matter of law.”

The statute points the same way when a court weighs relief under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751. Subdivision 3a directs the court to consider “the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each other.” It also says written agreements “between or among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders and the corporation,” including “buy-sell agreements,” are “presumed to reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agreements.” In Berreman, which involved a company with about 225 shareholders, the court said subdivision 3a “does not directly apply in this case.” It held the buy-back agreement’s presumed reasonableness “not dispositive” because the owner chose the retirement that triggered the buy-back. It still found no frustrated expectation, because he “did not have a reasonable expectation that he would be informed of any speculative discussions West’s directors had about the financial future of West.”

For an LLC, the statutory duty turns on how the company is managed and on the operating agreement. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110, subd. 2, “To the extent the operating agreement does not otherwise provide for a matter described in subdivision 1, this chapter governs the matter.” Subdivision 4 says “If not manifestly unreasonable,” the operating agreement may “restrict or eliminate the duty” to account to the company, to refrain from dealing adversely with it, and to refrain from competing with it, each as that clause describes. It may also “identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty,” “alter the duty of care, except to authorize intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law,” and “alter any other fiduciary duty, including eliminating particular aspects of that duty.” Subdivision 3 sets the limit: an operating agreement may not, “subject to subdivisions 4 to 7, eliminate the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, or any other fiduciary duty,” or, “subject to subdivisions 4 to 7, eliminate the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 322C.0409, subdivision 4.” Where the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, the statute’s rules are these:

  • Member-managed company. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409, subd. 1, “A member of a member-managed limited liability company owes to the company and, subject to section 322C.0901, subdivision 2, the other members the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care stated in subdivisions 2 and 3.”
  • Manager-managed or board-managed company. Subdivisions 7 and 8 each say “A member does not have any fiduciary duty to the company or to any other member solely by reason of being a member.” The same subdivisions put the duties on those who run the company: subdivision 7 says “Subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 apply to the manager or managers and not the members,” and subdivision 8 says “Subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 apply to the governors and not the members.”
  • Approval after disclosure. Subdivision 6 says all the members “may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty.”
  • Every LLC. Subdivision 4 requires each member to act “consistently with the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing, including acting in a manner, in light of the operating agreement, that is honest, fair, and reasonable.” Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110, subd. 3, an operating agreement may not, subject to subdivisions 4 to 7, eliminate this obligation, and subdivision 4 lets it “prescribe the standards by which to measure the performance of the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 322C.0409, subdivision 4.”

A duty can also arise from the owners’ relationship rather than the statute. In Hoskin v. Krsnak, No. A23-1275 (Minn. App. June 1, 2026), a nonprecedential opinion on remand, the Court of Appeals let a former LLC member’s fiduciary-duty claim proceed past a motion to dismiss. It said, in words quoted from earlier decisions, that “A fiduciary relationship may exist where there is a” disparity of business experience and invited confidence, and that “the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a question of fact.”

Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0603, subd. 1(2), in a member-managed company a departing member’s own “fiduciary duties as a member end with regard to matters arising and events occurring after the person’s dissociation.”

How Long Does a Former Owner Have to Sue in Minnesota?

The deadline depends on the claim. For contract and fraud claims, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1, says actions “shall be commenced within six years” when brought “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed” or “for relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” The subdivision opens with “Except where the Uniform Commercial Code otherwise prescribes,” which matters for a buyout note. Because the fraud period runs from discovery, the date of “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud” can matter as much as the closing date. In Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012), deciding a fraud claim’s timeliness on summary judgment, the Minnesota Supreme Court said “We judge discovery of the fraud under the reasonable person standard.” It added that the facts constituting the fraud “are deemed to have been discovered when they were actually discovered or,” in words it quoted from an earlier decision, “by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.” Check the current text of § 541.05 before relying on these periods.

A negotiable buyout note has its own rule. The Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 3 “applies to negotiable instruments” (Minn. Stat. § 336.3-102(a)). For those notes, Minn. Stat. § 336.3-118(a) says “an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.” Check the current text of § 336.3-118 before relying on that period.

A Minnesota Securities Act claim has a shorter outer limit. Under § 80A.76(j), a person may not obtain relief “(2) under subsection (b), other than for violation of section 80A.49, or under subsection (c) or (f), unless the action is instituted within the earlier of two years after discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years after the violation.” Check the current text of § 80A.76 before relying on that period.

Before the former owner starts a suit, the buyers can cut off a state securities claim with a rescission offer that meets the statute’s terms. Under Minn. Stat. § 80A.77, a seller “may not maintain an action under section 80A.76 if” the seller “receives in a record, before the action is instituted,” an offer meeting that section’s terms. For a claim under § 80A.76(c), clause (1)(C) of § 80A.77 describes “an offer to tender the security, on payment by the seller of an amount equal to the purchase price paid, less income received on the security by the purchaser and interest from the date of the sale,” or, if the purchaser no longer owns the security, an offer to pay damages as that clause measures them.

Clause (1)(A) of § 80A.77 requires that the offer state “the respect in which liability under section 80A.76 may have arisen,” fairly advise the seller of the seller’s rights, and include “any financial or other information necessary to correct all material misrepresentations or omissions” in the information the chapter required to be furnished. Clause (2) of § 80A.77 requires that the offer state “that it must be accepted by the purchaser, seller, or recipient of investment advice within 30 days after the date of its receipt by the purchaser, seller, or recipient of investment advice or any shorter period, of not less than three days, that the administrator, by order, specifies.” Clause (3) of § 80A.77 requires that the offeror have “the present ability to pay the amount offered or to tender the security under paragraph (1).” Clause (4) requires that the offer be delivered or sent by a method that makes sure the seller receives it. Clause (5) requires that a seller who accepts “in a record within the period specified under paragraph (2)” be “paid in accordance with the terms of the offer.” Check the current text of § 80A.77 before relying on that period.

How Do Indemnity, Escrow, and Setoff Terms Shape the Dispute?

The purchase agreement’s risk terms decide much of a post-closing fight, because they say who pays for a breached promise, from what money, and on what notice. I suggest reading these terms before responding to the former owner’s demand, because each one can change what you owe or what you can claim back:

  1. Indemnification. Which representations each side made, how long they survive closing, any cap or deductible, and the notice a claim requires.
  2. Escrow or holdback. Whether part of the price sits with a third party or with the buyers to cover claims, and how it is released.
  3. Setoff. Whether the buyers may reduce note payments by amounts the seller owes them. Without that right, withholding a payment can be its own breach. If the company itself bought the interest and is an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0405, subd. 6, says “If indebtedness is issued as a distribution, each payment of principal or interest on the indebtedness is treated as a distribution, the effect of which is measured on the date the payment is made.” Subdivision 1 bars a distribution if afterward “the company would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of the company’s activities” or would fail that subdivision’s asset test. Under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0406, a member, manager, or governor who consents to a distribution that violates that limit, and in consenting fails to comply with § 322C.0409, “is personally liable to the company for the amount of the distribution that exceeds the amount that could have been distributed without the violation of section 322C.0405.”
  4. Fee shifting. Whether the agreement lets the prevailing party recover attorney fees. In Hoskin, the district court awarded fees to the buyers under transfer agreements providing that “In any action to enforce this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party its costs and attorney fees,” but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the award because, once the dismissal was reversed, the buyers were “no longer the ‘prevailing party’ and are not entitled to contractual costs and attorney fees at this time.”
  5. Dispute resolution. Any mediation step, arbitration clause, venue, or choice of law.

Claims can also run against the former owner. For an LLC, Minn. Stat. § 322C.0603, subd. 2, says “A person’s dissociation as a member of a limited liability company does not of itself discharge the person from any debt, obligation, or other liability to the company or the other members that the person incurred while a member.” A buyout agreement and its release may settle some of those liabilities, so the agreement’s words decide which survive.

What Can Insurance and Company Indemnification Cover?

The company may have to pay the defense of an owner sued because of an official role that the indemnification statutes define, and its insurance may cover the claim. Under Minn. Stat. § 302A.521, subd. 2(a), “a corporation shall indemnify a person made or threatened to be made a party to a proceeding by reason of the former or present official capacity of the person” against costs that include “settlements, and reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees and disbursements,” if the person meets the subdivision’s conditions. Those conditions include that the person “acted in good faith” and received no improper personal benefit. Minn. Stat. § 322C.0408, subd. 2(a), sets a parallel rule for an LLC, with the added condition that the person “received no improper personal benefit and complied with the duties stated in sections 322C.0405 and 322C.0409, if applicable.” Subdivision 3 of each section adds advances of defense costs on a written request, subject to the conditions and the determination described below.

Three details decide how much help this gives:

  1. Capacity. Mandatory indemnification reaches a proceeding brought “by reason of the former or present official capacity of the person,” and it covers the judgments, settlements, and “reasonable expenses” the subdivision lists. For an LLC, § 322C.0408, subd. 1(c), says “‘Official capacity’ means (1) with respect to a member of a member-managed company, a manager of a manager-managed company, or a governor of a board-managed company, actions taken in that capacity.” Clause (2) of each definition reaches “the employment relationship undertaken by an employee” of the company (§ 322C.0408, subd. 1(c)(2); § 302A.521, subd. 1(c)(2)). A claim against owners only as personal buyers of the shares may fall outside it.
  2. Advances. Under § 302A.521, subd. 3, a person threatened or made a party is entitled, “upon written request to the corporation,” to payment of reasonable expenses “in advance of the final disposition of the proceeding,” on the written affirmation, undertaking, and determination that subdivision requires. Section 322C.0408, subd. 3, says the same for an LLC. Under subdivision 6 of each section, parties to the suit are not counted on that determination. Under § 302A.521, subd. 6, a corporation’s board acts “by a majority of a quorum, if the directors who are at the time parties to the proceeding are not counted for determining either a majority or the presence of a quorum.” Under § 322C.0408, subd. 6, in an LLC that is not board-managed, “the membership interests held by parties to the proceeding must not be counted in determining the presence of a quorum and are not considered to be present and entitled to vote on the determination.” Each section’s last route is a determination “by a court in this state, which may be the same court in which the proceeding involving the person’s liability took place, upon application of the person and any notice the court requires.”
  3. Limits. The company’s governing documents can prohibit or condition indemnification and advances. Under subdivision 4 of each section, the articles, bylaws, or operating agreement “may prohibit indemnification or advances of expenses otherwise required by this section or may impose conditions on indemnification or advances of expenses in addition to the conditions contained in subdivisions 2 and 3 including, without limitation, monetary limits,” if the limits “apply equally to all persons or to all persons within a given class.” For a corporation, a limit “may not apply to or affect the right of a person to indemnification or advances of expenses with respect to any acts or omissions of the person occurring prior to the effective date” of the provision creating it. Under § 322C.0408, subd. 4, the same rule covers acts “occurring before the effective date of a provision in the articles of organization, a member control agreement, or the date of adoption of a provision in the bylaws establishing the prohibition or limit.”

Subdivision 7 of each section lets the company buy insurance for its officials. Whether a policy covers a former owner’s claim, and when notice is due, turns on the policy’s own terms. I suggest sending the complaint or demand letter to the insurer as soon as it arrives, because the policy’s notice terms set the time for reporting a claim. An insurer that defends while disputing coverage sends a reservation of rights letter.

What Happens After the Former Owner Serves a Lawsuit?

In Minnesota, a lawsuit can start before anything is filed with the court, and the time to answer runs from service of the summons. Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01, a civil action is commenced against each defendant “(a) when the summons is served upon that defendant; or (b) at the date of signing a waiver of service pursuant to Rule 4.05; or (c) when the summons is delivered for service to the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides . . . but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first publication thereof is made.” Check the current text of Rule 3.01 before relying on that period. So an unfiled summons and complaint handed to you is a real lawsuit, and no court file may exist yet.

Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.01, “Defendant shall serve an answer within 21 days after service of the summons upon that defendant unless the court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 4.043.” The same rule adds that “The service of a motion permitted under this rule alters these periods of time as follows unless a different time is fixed by order of the court: (1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within 14 days after service of notice of the court’s action.” Check the current text of Rule 12.01 before relying on these periods. A defense based on the release can be raised early. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 says “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively” a list of defenses that includes “release.” A motion to dismiss on the release is judged on the complaint itself. Under Hoskin (Minn. 2025), it may be granted only if the complaint’s own allegations, read in the former owner’s favor, establish a defense the former owner cannot rebut. The section on how the buyout release affects the former owner’s claims quotes that holding.

What Are the Options for Responding to a Former Owner’s Claim?

The options run from a direct conversation to a court motion, and the right one depends on what the former owner wants, what the documents say, and what a fight would cost the business. Each has a place:

  1. A direct conversation, owner to owner. It fits when the dispute is a misunderstood figure or a late payment and the relationship still works. I suggest keeping the talk to facts and options, because an admission can be quoted back later.
  2. Paying what is undisputed. It fits when part of the claim is plainly owed, such as a missed installment. Paying it narrows the fight. If the company itself owes the note and is an LLC, the limit on distributions in § 322C.0405 can bar a payment. Under § 322C.0406, those who consent to a barred payment can be personally liable; the section on indemnity, escrow, and setoff terms quotes both rules.
  3. An accounting review of the disputed number. It fits an earn-out or working-capital dispute, where the question is how a figure was calculated. The agreement may already name the accountant or method.
  4. Tendering to the insurer and requesting indemnification. It fits any served suit naming owners in a company role, under the rules in the section on insurance above.
  5. A negotiated settlement with a new release. It fits when the cost of defense exceeds the realistic exposure. I suggest that the new agreement state the key facts each side relied on, such as the financial figures exchanged. The reason is that the Great Plains rule, quoted in the section on fraud, turns on whether the agreement’s express terms contradict the claimed misrepresentation.
  6. A motion to dismiss on the release. It fits only when the complaint itself, read in the former owner’s favor, establishes every element of the release defense. Under Hoskin (Minn. 2025), a release’s “mere existence is insufficient to bar” the complaint, and in that case a complaint alleging that the releases were signed involuntarily survived the motion.
  7. Counterclaims and indemnity claims. They fit when the former owner breached the agreement’s representations or owes the company.

A demand letter from a departing owner’s lawyer and the written response to it are described in a former partner’s lawyer claimed a broken separation agreement.

Can we stop paying the buyout note because the former owner sued us?

It depends on what the note and purchase agreement say about default and setoff. If the company itself owes the note and is an LLC, it also depends on whether the LLC statute’s limit on distributions allows each payment. A missed installment can itself be a default under the note’s own terms, which may let the former owner demand the full balance and add a claim for nonpayment to the suit. The section on indemnity, escrow, and setoff terms quotes the distribution rules, and the section on deadlines quotes the period for suing on a negotiable note.

Does the Minnesota Securities Act apply if we bought an LLC interest instead of stock?

It can. Minn. Stat. § 80A.41(30) defines a security to include “stock” and, in clause (D), “an interest in a limited partnership and a limited liability company” as an investment contract. Clause (E) excludes an equity interest in an entity with not more than 35 holders when “100 percent of the equity interest of such entity is sold as a means to effect the sale of the business,” on that clause’s further conditions. Buying out one owner while the others keep their interests is not a sale of 100% of the equity.

Is a release of employment claims valid if the former owner also worked for the company?

It can be, if it meets two sets of rules. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.31, subd. 2, a release of Minnesota Human Rights Act claims “may be rescinded within 15 calendar days of its execution,” and the releasing party “shall be informed in writing of the right to rescind,” except that a release “given in settlement of a claim filed with the department or with another administrative agency or judicial body is valid and final upon execution.” For federal age claims, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) says an individual “may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary,” and its minimum conditions include that “the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement” and a revocation period “of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement.” For a waiver settling an age claim already filed in court or with the EEOC, the statute instead requires that “the individual is given a reasonable period of time within which to consider the settlement agreement.” Check the current text of § 363A.31 and 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) before relying on these periods.

Must the former owner return the buyout money before suing to undo the deal?

Not to survive a motion to dismiss, under the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Hoskin v. Krsnak, No. A23-1275 (Minn. Sept. 10, 2025). The district court there had dismissed a former member’s suit in part because he did not allege that he returned what he received, and the Supreme Court said that reasoning “fails for the same reasons already stated: Hoskin was not required to anticipate and rebut the affirmative defense, and the allegations in Hoskin’s complaint do not establish that the releases necessarily bar his claims.” It said it had “no need to address” the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that requiring a return first was error. The Court of Appeals’ 2024 opinion in the case quoted an older Supreme Court decision, Marple v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad, 132 N.W. 333 (Minn. 1911). Under that rule, a party rescinding a voidable contract “must return or offer to return what he received,” relaxed “when substantial justice can be meted out in the final disposition of the case.” For a securities claim, Minn. Stat. § 80A.76(c) lets the seller recover “the security, and any income received on the security, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees determined by the court, upon the tender of the purchase price,” and “The tender referred to in paragraph (1) may be made any time before entry of judgment.”

Will we recover our attorney fees if the former owner's claim fails?

It depends on the purchase agreement and the claim. A prevailing-party clause in the purchase agreement turns on who prevails. In Hoskin v. Krsnak, No. A23-1275 (Minn. Sept. 10, 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a fee award to buyers who had won dismissal on the releases. Once it reversed the dismissal, the buyers were “no longer the ‘prevailing party’ and are not entitled to contractual costs and attorney fees at this time.” In a suit under Minn. Stat. § 302A.751, subdivision 4 lets the court, in its discretion, award “reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees and disbursements,” against a party that “has acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith.” The fee language in Minn. Stat. § 80A.76(c) runs the other way: it lets a seller who wins recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees determined by the court.”

Defending a Former Owner’s Buyout Claim

A closed buyout does not end the former owner’s right to sue, but it gives the remaining owners real defenses: the release, the purchase agreement’s terms, and the filing deadlines in the statutes. The questions that decide these cases include what the release covers, whether the former owner can prove fraud or duress that defeats the release, and what the buyers knew and disclosed before closing. These claims are one kind of business partner dispute. If a former owner you bought out has sued or threatened to sue, email [email protected] with a brief description, and I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.