Minnesota law defines sexual harassment by statute and prohibits it for employers with one or more employees, apart from exclusions the statute lists. Whether your company is liable depends first on who did the harassing. For a supervisor’s harassment, the employee does not have to prove the company knew or should have known, and the company has no defense when the harassment ends in a firing, demotion, or similar action. For a coworker’s harassment, the question is whether the company knew or should have known and failed to take appropriate remedial action. The definition and the remedies come from the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), chapter 363A of the Minnesota Statutes. The employer-liability rules come from Minnesota Supreme Court decisions applying it, which often rely on federal decisions under Title VII. Federal Title VII adds a second set of claims for employers with fifteen or more employees.

This page is written for the owner, executive, HR leader, or board member who has a complaint on the desk, or wants the company ready before one arrives. It covers what counts as harassment, when the company is liable, and how to investigate and avoid retaliation. It also covers how a board should respond when a senior leader is accused and what a charge, lawsuit, or settlement involves. For the compliance side, see sexual harassment compliance, and for related employer-side issues, see my Minnesota employment law page.

What Counts as Sexual Harassment Under Minnesota Law?

Sexual harassment under the MHRA is unwelcome sexual conduct or communication that is tied to job decisions or that substantially interferes with work or creates a hostile environment. Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 43 provides that “sexual harassment” includes “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature” when one of three conditions is met:

  1. submission to the conduct “is made a term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining employment”;
  2. “submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting that individual’s employment”; or
  3. the conduct “has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment” or “creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment” environment.

The first two describe a trade of job benefits for sexual compliance. The third is the hostile environment claim. Lewd jokes, sexual talk, and explicit messages are “verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature,” so whether they are unlawful turns on those conditions and, for a hostile environment, on the severe-or-pervasive test. Subdivision 13 of the same section provides that “discriminate” includes “harassment,” and Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2 makes it an unfair employment practice for an employer, because of sex, to “discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.” That subdivision lists “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” alongside “sex,” so the MHRA protects both directly. In Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII bars firing an employee for being gay or transgender. The Court reasoned that “An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”

In Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2013), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “a sexual harassment claim does not require proof that the conduct was directed at the victims because of sex.” A harasser’s directing “inappropriate, sexual comments at both male and female employees” therefore could not support a finding that the conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to be sexual harassment.

The hostile environment claim still uses the “severe or pervasive” test drawn from federal law. In Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222 (Minn. 2020), the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to abandon the test. It held that conduct qualifies “if a reasonable person, considering the totality of the circumstances, would find the alleged behavior objectively abusive or offensive.” The court added that “the standard must evolve to reflect changes in societal attitudes towards what is acceptable behavior in the workplace,” and that “A single, severe incident may support a claim for relief.” It also said the decision “does not transform the Human Rights Act into a general civility code.” How courts apply that test to specific facts is covered on my page about a hostile work environment in Minnesota.

The MHRA reaches small employers. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 16, an employer is “a person who has one or more employees” for MHRA purposes. Subdivision 15 covers an employee “who resides or works in this state” under the same Act. Minn. Stat. § 363A.20, subd. 1 provides: “The provisions of section 363A.08 shall not apply to the employment of any individual: (1) by the individual’s parent, grandparent, spouse, child, or grandchild; or (2) in the domestic service of any person.” For religious nonprofits, Minn. Stat. § 363A.26 provides that nothing in the chapter prohibits a “religious association, religious corporation, or religious society that is not organized for private profit,” consistent with First Amendment and Minnesota constitutional protections “including ministerial exceptions provided therein,” from “taking any action with respect to education, employment, housing and real property, or use of facilities.” The section “shall not apply to secular business activities” unrelated to the organization’s religious and educational purposes. Title VII, by contrast, defines an employer in subsection (b) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as one with “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” The federal definition also excludes some employers, including the United States and certain tax-exempt private membership clubs other than labor organizations.

When Is a Company Liable for a Supervisor’s Harassment?

A Minnesota employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor unless it proves a two-part defense. It has no defense when the harassment ends in a firing, demotion, or similar action. In Frieler v. Carlson Marketing Group, Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2008), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that after a 2001 amendment to the MHRA, “a plaintiff who brings a claim under the MHRA for sexual harassment by a supervisor is not required to prove that his or her employer knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and failed to take timely and appropriate action.” Three justices dissented from that holding.

The court then adopted the federal rule from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Ellerth and Faragher decisions: “an employer is subject to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over a victimized employee.” Quoting those decisions, Frieler allows the employer to avoid liability when no tangible employment action was taken, if it proves both:

  1. “that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and
  2. “that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

The defense is unavailable when the supervisor’s harassment “culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment,” again quoting the federal decisions.

Who counts as a supervisor is where Minnesota and federal law part ways. Frieler held that “the EEOC definition should be used for determining whether a person is a supervisor for purposes of sexual harassment claims under the MHRA.” The court quoted the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Its definition reaches anyone who “has authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the employee; or * * * the individual has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.” For federal Title VII claims, the U.S. Supreme Court later adopted a narrower rule in a racial harassment case: an employee is a supervisor “if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.” Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013). For a Minnesota company, a team lead who assigns daily work may be a supervisor under the MHRA even when that lead cannot hire or fire.

When Is a Company Liable for Harassment by a Coworker?

For harassment by a coworker, the question is whether the company knew or should have known about it and failed to take appropriate remedial action. Kenneh shows how a court applies that question. The harasser was a maintenance coordinator who worked at several of the employer’s sites. When the employee complained, the employer placed him on paid leave, investigated, and found the results “inconclusive.” Its Director of Human Resources then assured the employee that he “would receive additional sexual harassment training and would be instructed not to be alone with” her.

The court recounted that “Neither Kenneh’s complaint nor Homeward Bound’s investigation stopped Johnson’s behavior.” She testified that she reported the continuing conduct to her supervisor at least twice more. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that her testimony created a genuine issue of material fact on whether the employer knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to take appropriate remedial action. The court reversed summary judgment for the employer. A company that hears the conduct has continued should act again, because the fact question in Kenneh arose from the reports made after the first response.

The EEOC’s federal regulation for Title VII provides that an employer is responsible for harassment between fellow employees where it “knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d). Under federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court has described the coworker rule this way: “the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.” Vance, 570 U.S. 421.

What Should a Harassment Policy Do for Your Defense?

A written policy with more than one way to report is evidence for the first part of the Frieler defense, reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment. In Frieler, the employer’s policy told a complainant to report “to his or her supervisor, human resources, or the ethics hotline,” and the opinion noted: “There is a question of how extensive the policy was, whether all the employees knew of the policy, how the policy was disseminated to employees, whether all employees received training about the topic.” The second part of the defense asks whether the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

Several features should be in the policy, because each one supplies evidence for the defense:

  1. A definition that tracks the statute. The policy should describe the conduct in § 363A.03, subd. 43, including comments and messages, and cover harassment by customers and vendors.
  2. More than one reporting path. At least one path should bypass the employee’s own supervisor, so an employee harassed by that supervisor has a way to report.
  3. A duty for managers to pass reports on. A manager who hears a complaint should be required to send it to the designated person, because the company may be treated as knowing what its managers know.
  4. A promise of no retaliation, matching the reprisal statute, Minn. Stat. § 363A.15.
  5. Proof of distribution. Signed acknowledgments and training records show employees knew how to report.

The wording of a non-contractual policy does not change what an employee must show under the MHRA. In Kenneh, the employee acknowledged that the employee guide’s statements were “not contractual.” She argued that a handbook line, “HARASSMENT OF ANY KIND IS NOT TOLERATED,” replaced the severe-or-pervasive standard with a zero-tolerance standard. The court disagreed: “The terms of a non-contractual employment policy do not alter statutory definitions or the showing needed to establish a statutory claim under the Human Rights Act.” A company may hold employees to a stricter standard than the law for discipline purposes, and the claim against the company is still measured by the statute. My page on the employee handbook covers where the policy fits among other handbook terms.

How Should a Company Investigate a Harassment Complaint?

A company should begin a neutral investigation promptly, protect the complainant in the meantime, reach a written conclusion, act on it, and check afterward that the conduct stopped. Those steps are the evidence for the “correct promptly” part of the Frieler defense and for the remedial action Kenneh looked for.

  1. Choose the investigator. The investigator should be someone with no reporting relationship to either person. When the accused is a senior leader, an outside investigator avoids the appearance that a subordinate is judging a boss.
  2. Take interim steps. Paid leave for the accused, a schedule change, or a change in reporting lines can protect the complainant while the investigation runs. Interim steps should not burden the complainant, for the reprisal reasons below.
  3. Interview and collect. The investigator should interview the complainant, the accused, and witnesses, and collect messages, schedules, and any video before they are overwritten.
  4. Decide and document. A written report should state the findings, the evidence for each, and the action taken. An “inconclusive” finding is a finding too, and it should still come with protective measures.
  5. Follow up. A check-in with the complainant after the action shows whether the conduct stopped. In Kenneh, the employee’s reports that the conduct continued after the employer’s first response created a fact question on whether the employer failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Minnesota’s personnel-record statute affects the investigation file. Under Minn. Stat. § 181.960, subd. 4, the personnel record does not include “information relating to the investigation of a violation of a criminal or civil statute by an employee or an investigation of employee conduct for which the employer may be liable, unless and until” two conditions are met. First, “the investigation is completed and, in cases of an alleged criminal violation, the employer has received notice from the prosecutor that no action will be taken or all criminal proceedings and appeals have been exhausted.” Second, “the employer takes adverse personnel action based on the information contained in the investigation records.” Once both conditions are met, an employee’s right to review under Minn. Stat. § 181.961, subd. 1 applies: “Upon written request by an employee, the employer shall provide the employee with an opportunity to review the employee’s personnel record.” Subdivision 4 of § 181.960 also leaves out of the personnel record “any portion of a written or transcribed statement by a coworker of the employee that concerns the job performance or job-related misconduct of the employee that discloses the identity of the coworker by name, inference, or otherwise.” An investigation report should be written expecting that the disciplined employee may read it. More detail on each stage is in my guide to a workplace investigation.

How Should You Discipline an Employee for Sexual Harassment or Lewd Talk?

When your investigation finds that harassment happened, the discipline you impose should match how serious the conduct was, and it should be enough to stop it. The coworker standard above asks whether the company took appropriate remedial action. In Kenneh, the employee’s reports that the conduct continued after the employer’s first response created a fact question on that point.

The options run from a documented warning through discharge:

  1. A written warning for a single crude joke or comment, paired with a review of the policy.
  2. Required training or coaching added to the warning, for a pattern of sexual talk or messages that did not involve threats or touching.
  3. Suspension, loss of a bonus, or removal of supervisory duties for repeated conduct, conduct after an earlier warning, or explicit messages sent to a subordinate.
  4. Transfer of the harasser when the two employees should no longer work together. I suggest leaving the complainant’s job where it is unless the complainant asks to move, because a transfer of the complainant can be treated as a reprisal under § 363A.15, discussed below.
  5. Discharge for sexual touching, a threat or a promise tied to a job decision, or conduct that continues after earlier discipline.

In choosing among them, I suggest weighing the severity of the conduct, how often it happened, whether the harasser supervises the complainant, any earlier warnings, and what you have done for similar conduct before. I also suggest holding a manager to a stricter standard than a line employee. A manager who joins in sexual banter signals that the policy is not enforced. A supervisor’s harassment can also make the company liable under the Frieler rule above without proof that the company knew about it. Consistency matters too: the same conduct should draw the same discipline whatever the harasser’s rank or value to the company, because inconsistent discipline is hard to explain to an agency or a jury.

When the investigation cannot confirm the complaint, discipline of the accused employee for the alleged harassment is hard to justify. I suggest a written reminder of the policy to both employees, an invitation to the complainant to report anything further, and continued protective steps, as the FAQ below on inconclusive findings describes. In every case, I suggest telling the complainant that you acted, recording the discipline and the reasons in the investigation file, and checking back later to confirm the conduct stopped.

How Does Retaliation Risk Change After a Complaint?

Once an employee complains, the company’s decisions about that employee are judged against the MHRA’s reprisal statute. Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 protects a person who “opposed a practice forbidden under this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” It provides that “A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment.” The statute names specific employer acts as reprisal when taken because of that activity, including to “depart from any customary employment practice” and to “transfer or assign the individual to a lesser position in terms of wages, hours, job classification, job security, or other employment status.”

Witnesses can be protected too, because the statute covers anyone who “assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” Two other laws can apply to the same report:

  • The Minnesota Whistleblower Act. Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1 bars an employer from retaliating because “the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an employee, in good faith, reports a violation, suspected violation, or planned violation of any federal or state law or common law or rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.” Under Minn. Stat. § 181.935, an injured employee “may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law, together with costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”
  • Title VII. For an employer with fifteen or more employees, subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 bars discrimination against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”

In the months after a complaint, I suggest that someone outside the chain of command review any discipline, schedule change, or performance action involving a complainant or witness before it happens. The timing alone can be offered as evidence of retaliation. More on the reprisal statute is on my page about Minnesota’s retaliation statute.

How Should a Board Respond When the CEO or an Owner Is Accused?

When the accused is the CEO or another senior leader, the board, not the accused, should control the response, and it should act through directors who have no stake in the outcome. Frieler imposes vicarious liability for harassment by a supervisor “with immediate (or successively higher) authority” over the employee, and a CEO’s authority runs over every employee. The usual reporting path also runs through the accused, so someone other than the accused has to receive reports and direct the company’s response.

For a Minnesota business corporation, the directors’ duty is set by Minn. Stat. § 302A.251, subd. 1: “A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.” Subdivision 2 allows directors to rely on “counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters that the director reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or expert competence.” That reliance is lost for “a director who has knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes the reliance otherwise permitted by paragraph (a) unwarranted.”

Minn. Stat. § 302A.241, subd. 1 lets the board act through a committee and provides: “Committees may include a special litigation committee consisting of one or more independent directors or other independent persons to consider legal rights or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and remedies should be pursued.” The same subdivision provides that “Committees other than special litigation committees and committees formed pursuant to section 302A.673, subdivision 1, paragraph (d), are subject at all times to the direction and control of the board.” Subdivision 6 adds that forming a committee “does not alone constitute compliance by a director with the standard of conduct set forth in section 302A.251,” so the full board still needs to follow the committee’s work. A board response should generally include these steps:

  1. Take the matter out of the accused’s hands. The accused leader should have no role in choosing the investigator, receiving reports, or deciding interim steps.
  2. Form a committee of independent directors under a written resolution, with authority to hire an outside investigator and an attorney who represents the company, not the accused.
  3. Set interim measures for the accused leader’s contact with the complainant and witnesses, and tell the complainant who to contact during the investigation.
  4. Decide on the findings, and record in the minutes what the committee received and what it relied on, because that record is the board’s evidence that it met the § 302A.251 standard.

The accused leader may also face personal exposure, though not as an aider and abettor for the leader’s own harassment alone. Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 makes it an unfair discriminatory practice for any person “intentionally to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce a person to engage in any of the practices forbidden by this chapter.” In Rasmussen, where the companies’ sole owner was the harasser, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that he “cannot be individually liable as an aider and abettor” under that section. Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 separately makes it an unfair discriminatory practice “for any individual who participated in the alleged discrimination as a perpetrator” to “intentionally engage in any reprisal.” That gap between the leader’s interests and the company’s is the reason for separate attorneys. A nonprofit corporation’s directors have a parallel standard under Minn. Stat. § 317A.251, and an LLC’s members, managers, and governors owe duties under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0409.

What Does a Charge or Lawsuit Put at Stake for the Company?

An employee can file a charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights or sue the company directly. A court can award up to three times actual damages, punitive damages, a civil penalty, and attorney’s fees. Minn. Stat. § 363A.33, subd. 1 provides: “The commissioner or a person may bring a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice directly to district court.” Once a charge is filed with the department, the same subdivision sets separate conditions for when the charging party may move the claim to court. The filing period is set by Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3: “(a) A claim of an unfair discriminatory practice must be brought as a civil action pursuant to section 363A.33, subdivision 1, filed in a charge with a local commission pursuant to section 363A.07, subdivision 3, or filed in a charge with the commissioner within one year after the occurrence of the practice.” In Abel v. Abbott Northwestern Hospital, 947 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2020), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “the continuing violations doctrine tolled the statute of limitations” for an MHRA employment discrimination claim. The court noted that the doctrine “is particularly relevant in hostile environment claims” and that a continuing violation can be shown by “(1) a series of related acts, one or more of which fell within the limitations period, or (2) the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the limitations period.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on that period, because statutes are amended. A federal EEOC charge follows its own rules.

A charge filed with the department puts a duty on the company. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, “The respondent shall file with the department a written response setting out a summary of the details of the respondent’s position relative to the charge within 30 days of receipt of the charge.” The same subdivision provides: “If the respondent fails to respond with a written summary of the details of the respondent’s position within 30 days after service of the charge, and service was consistent with rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the commissioner, on behalf of the complaining party, may bring an action for default in district court pursuant to rule 55.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on that period, because statutes are amended.

Subdivision 3 imposes a second duty on the company. Paragraph (b) addresses mediation or a similar process that the company and a potential claimant voluntarily join before a charge is filed. It provides: “The running of the one-year limitation period is suspended during the time a potential charging party and respondent are voluntarily engaged in a dispute resolution process involving a claim of unlawful discrimination under this chapter.” It continues: “A potential respondent who participates in such a process with a potential charging party before a charge is filed or a civil action is brought shall notify the department and the charging party in writing of the participation in the process and the date the process commenced and shall also notify the department and the charging party of the ending date of the process.” The consequence is stated in the next sentence: “A respondent who fails to provide this notification is barred from raising the defense that the statute of limitations has run unless one year plus a period of time equal to the suspension period has passed.” Check the current text of the statute before relying on that period, because statutes are amended.

In court, the exposure is set by § 363A.33:

  • Damages. Under subdivision 8, the court “shall order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party who has suffered discrimination compensatory damages, including mental anguish or suffering, in an amount up to three times the actual damages sustained.”
  • Punitive damages. The standard is in Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1. Punitive damages are allowed “only upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others” under that section. When an employee committed the act, Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 2 provides that “Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or principal because of an act done by an agent only if” one of four listed conditions is met. Clause (3) covers an agent who “was employed in a managerial capacity with authority to establish policy and make planning level decisions for the principal and was acting in the scope of that employment,” and the other three clauses address authorization, unfitness, and ratification of the act. Subdivision 8 of § 363A.33 adds that “the court may also order the respondent to pay an aggrieved party punitive damages pursuant to section 549.20.” The $25,000 limit in subdivision 8 applies “where a political subdivision is a respondent.” In a case decided by an administrative law judge, Minn. Stat. § 363A.29, subd. 4 limits punitive damages to “not more than $25,000,” in addition to compensatory damages of up to three times the actual damages.
  • Civil penalty. Subdivision 8 requires a civil penalty to the state for a violation.
  • Jury and fees. Under subdivision 6, either side “is entitled to a jury trial,” and under subdivision 7, the court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”

The company’s earlier statements become evidence. In one charge of discrimination, the response I prepared for an employer attached as exhibits the company’s earlier written answers to the unemployment agency’s requests for information. What a company tells one agency about a separation can be compared with what it tells another, so the reasons given should match from the start. In one employment discrimination lawsuit I defended, the company’s initial disclosures were served with its employment practices liability policy attached. I suggest sending a new charge or complaint to the carrier under any employment practices liability insurance policy promptly, because each policy sets its own notice requirements.

How Do Settlement Terms Work in a Harassment Claim?

A Minnesota harassment settlement should not pay the money as wages or severance, and it should check confidentiality and arbitration terms against three federal statutes. An MHRA release that does not settle a claim already filed with an agency or court should come with written notice of the right to rescind it. Minn. Stat. § 181.141 provides: “In a sexual harassment or abuse settlement between an employer and an employee, when there is a financial settlement provided, the financial settlement cannot be provided as wages or severance pay to the employee regardless of whether the settlement includes a nondisclosure agreement.”

The release terms carry their own rules:

  1. MHRA rescission. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.31, subd. 2, a release of MHRA claims “may be rescinded within 15 calendar days of its execution, except that a waiver or release given in settlement of a claim filed with the department or with another administrative agency or judicial body is valid and final upon execution.” The statute requires that “A waiving or releasing party shall be informed in writing of the right to rescind the waiver or release.” I suggest holding payment until the rescission period ends, because a rescinded release leaves the claims open. Check the current text of the statute before relying on that period, because statutes are amended.
  2. Age claims. If the release also covers federal age discrimination claims, subsection (f) of 29 U.S.C. § 626 applies: “An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” The minimum terms include that “the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement,” and that “for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired.” Those periods and the other § 626(f) terms differ for group terminations and for claims already filed. Check the current text of the statute before relying on those periods, because statutes are amended.
  3. Confidentiality. Subsection (a) of the federal Speak Out Act, 42 U.S.C. § 19403, provides that “no nondisclosure clause or nondisparagement clause agreed to before the dispute arises shall be judicially enforceable in instances in which conduct is alleged to have violated Federal, Tribal, or State law.” A confidentiality term negotiated in the settlement itself is outside that rule. Subsection (d) provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit an employer and an employee from protecting trade secrets or proprietary information.” Under subsection (q) of 26 U.S.C. § 162, the federal income tax allows no deduction for “any settlement or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse if such settlement or payment is subject to a nondisclosure agreement,” or for “attorney’s fees related to such a settlement or payment.”
  4. Arbitration. Under subsection (a) of 9 U.S.C. § 402, at the election of the person alleging a sexual harassment dispute, “no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable” for a case relating to that dispute. My page on mandatory arbitration covers arbitration clauses more generally.

The legal path is not the only one. An early conversation between the company’s leader and the employee, or between the attorneys, can resolve a complaint before positions harden. A reassignment the employee asks for or a neutral reference can matter to the employee as much as money. Each option should be weighed against the company’s goals: closing the matter, keeping a valued employee, or establishing that the company acted correctly. Drafting details for the agreement itself are on my page about the severance agreement.

Should we transfer the employee who reported harassment?

Generally not, because a transfer made because the employee complained can be a reprisal. Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 provides that “A reprisal includes, but is not limited to, any form of intimidation, retaliation, or harassment.” It lists acts taken because an employee opposed a practice the Minnesota Human Rights Act forbids or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under it. Those acts include a decision to “depart from any customary employment practice” or to transfer the employee to a lesser position. I suggest changing the accused employee’s schedule, location, or reporting line, which protects the complainant without changing the complainant’s job.

What if the investigation cannot tell who is telling the truth?

An inconclusive finding still calls for protective steps and follow-up. In the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2020 Kenneh decision, the employer found its investigation inconclusive and assured the complainant that the accused employee “would receive additional sexual harassment training and would be instructed not to be alone with” her. The complainant reported that the conduct continued, and the court held that a fact question existed on whether the employer knew or should have known and failed to take appropriate remedial action.

Does a company with fewer than 15 employees have to follow these rules?

Generally yes. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 16, a Minnesota Human Rights Act employer is a person who has one or more employees, and the Act protects an employee who resides or works in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 363A.20, subd. 1 excludes employment by the individual’s parent, grandparent, spouse, child, or grandchild, and in domestic service, and Minn. Stat. § 363A.26 separately addresses religious organizations. Title VII’s threshold of fifteen or more employees in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) limits only the federal claim, so a small Minnesota company faces the state claim regardless.

Can our arbitration agreement send a harassment claim to arbitration?

Not if the employee chooses court. Under the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act, 9 U.S.C. § 402(a), the choice belongs to the person alleging a sexual harassment dispute. At that person’s election, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver is valid or enforceable for a case filed under federal, tribal, or state law that relates to the dispute. An agreement to arbitrate made after the dispute arises is outside that rule.

Is a confidentiality clause signed at hiring enforceable in a harassment dispute?

Generally not in court. The federal Speak Out Act, 42 U.S.C. § 19403(a), covers a nondisclosure or nondisparagement clause agreed to before a sexual harassment dispute arises. That clause is not judicially enforceable where the conduct is alleged to have violated federal, tribal, or state law. Subsection (d) still permits protecting “trade secrets or proprietary information.” Confidentiality negotiated in a settlement is outside subsection (a), but 26 U.S.C. § 162(q) allows no deduction for a harassment settlement or payment subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or for related attorney’s fees. Minn. Stat. § 181.141 also bars paying the settlement as wages or severance.

Can a manager be personally liable for harassment?

Yes, though not as an aider and abettor for the manager’s own harassment alone. Minn. Stat. § 363A.14 covers any person who intentionally aids, abets, incites, compels, or coerces a person to engage in a practice forbidden by the Minnesota Human Rights Act. In Rasmussen (Minn. 2013), an owner who was the sole harasser “cannot be individually liable as an aider and abettor.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 reaches any individual who participated in the alleged discrimination as a perpetrator and intentionally engages in reprisal. A manager who harassed and then retaliated, or who intentionally aided another person’s harassment, can be named with the company.

Is a company responsible when a customer harasses an employee?

It can be. The EEOC’s federal regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e), says an employer may be responsible for non-employees’ sexual harassment of employees in the workplace. That applies where the employer or its agents or supervisors knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. The regulation weighs the extent of the employer’s control over the non-employee. It governs Title VII enforcement; Minnesota courts often look to Title VII law when applying the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

Building a Defensible Response

A company builds most of its defense to a Minnesota sexual harassment claim before the claim is filed. The defense rests on a policy employees know about, a prompt investigation, protective steps that do not burden the complainant, follow-up, and records that show each step. When the accused is a senior leader, independent directors should run that process. When a charge or lawsuit arrives, the release, payment, confidentiality, and arbitration terms of any settlement should match the Minnesota and federal rules above.

If your company is responding to a harassment complaint and you want to know how these rules apply to your facts, email [email protected] with a brief description. I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents. More on employer-side matters is on my Minnesota employment law page.