A claim against your Minnesota business is too old when the person suing did not commence the lawsuit within the limitations period for that type of claim, counted from the day the claim accrued. That defense belongs to your business, and a court can treat it as given up if the business does not plead it or later add it by amendment.

The periods come from statutes, including chapter 541 of the Minnesota Statutes, the Uniform Commercial Code for sales of goods, and a separate statute for construction work. A contract clause or another state’s law can also supply the period. When the clock starts and what pauses it come mostly from Minnesota appellate decisions. This page is written for the owner or decision-maker of a Minnesota business sued or threatened over events that happened years ago, and it is part of my coverage of business litigation.

What Makes a Claim Too Old to Sue On in Minnesota?

A claim is too old when the plaintiff did not commence the action within the period for that claim, measured from accrual. Minn. Stat. § 541.01 provides: “Actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action accrues, except where a different limitation is prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code or, in special cases, by other statute.”

Three dates decide the question: which period applies, when the claim accrued, and when the action was commenced. Under Minnesota’s rules, commencement turns on service rather than the court filing date. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01 provides that “A civil action is commenced against each defendant” in listed ways, including “(a) when the summons is served upon that defendant” and “(b) at the date of signing a waiver of service pursuant to Rule 4.05.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01 also lists “(c) when the summons is delivered for service to the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides personally, by U.S. Mail (postage prepaid), by commercial courier with proof of delivery, or by electronic means consented to by the sheriff’s office either in writing or electronically; but such delivery shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first publication thereof is made.” Check the current text of Rule 3.01 before relying on that period.

For a business being sued, the commencement date under Rule 3.01 is the date to compare against the deadline. A statute can set its own commencement rule, as 29 U.S.C. § 256 does for federal Fair Labor Standards Act claims. Under Rule 3.01, that is the date the summons was served on it, the date it signed a waiver of service, or, when Rule 3.01(c) applies, the date the summons was delivered to the sheriff. I suggest writing down that date and how service happened as soon as the papers arrive, because each later step in the defense measures from it.

Which Limitations Period Applies to the Claim Against Your Business?

The period depends on the type of claim, so each claim in a complaint or demand letter needs its own check. Contract claims and many other business claims fall under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1, which opens: “Except where the Uniform Commercial Code otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within six years.” Check the current text of § 541.05 before relying on these periods.

The clauses of that list most relevant to a business dispute are:

  1. Contracts: “(1) upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed.”
  2. Statutory claims whose own statute sets no period: “(2) upon a liability created by statute, other than those arising upon a penalty or forfeiture or where a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.”
  3. Other injuries: actions “for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated.”
  4. Fraud: “(6) for relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”

A statute that creates a claim can set its own period, because § 541.01 applies the chapter’s periods except where a different limitation is prescribed “in special cases, by other statute.” For trade secrets, Minn. Stat. § 325C.06 provides: “An action for misappropriation must be brought within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d), provides: “A civil action under subsection (b) may not be commenced later than 3 years after the date on which the misappropriation with respect to which the action would relate is discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered.” Check the current text of § 325C.06 and 18 U.S.C. § 1836 before relying on these periods.

Some claims carry a shorter period. Minn. Stat. § 541.07 opens: “Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 541.05, 541.073, 541.076, or 604.205 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years.” Its first clause covers actions “(1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury,” among others. The Minnesota Supreme Court reads that clause narrowly. In Sipe v. STS Manufacturing, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2013), a wrongful-discharge claim under a Minnesota statute, it concluded “that section 541.07(1) is limited to common law causes of action not created by statute.” It also described its interpretation of the phrase “other tort resulting in personal injury” as “limited to common law intentional torts.” Wage and commission claims fall under its clause “(5) for the recovery of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties accruing under any federal or state law respecting the payment of wages or overtime or damages, fees, or penalties except, that if the employer fails to submit payroll records by a specified date upon request of the Department of Labor and Industry or if the nonpayment is willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence, the limitation is three years,” where “wages” means “all remuneration for services or employment, including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash, where the relationship of master and servant exists.” In Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011), the Minnesota Supreme Court, quoting an earlier decision, wrote that it has “consistently applied this statute of limitations period whenever . . . the gravamen of the action is the breach of an employment contract.” Check the current text of § 541.07 before relying on these periods.

A claim under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act has its own period: 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) provides that it “may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued.” Under 29 U.S.C. § 256, that action “shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is filed,” except that in a collective action, a claimant whose written consent was not filed with the complaint, or who was not named in it, is commenced “on the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in the court in which the action was commenced.” Check the current text of 29 U.S.C. §§ 255 and 256 before relying on these periods.

For strict-liability product claims, subdivision 2 of § 541.05 provides: “Unless otherwise provided by law, any action based on the strict liability of the defendant and arising from the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product shall be commenced within four years.” For a contract to sell goods, Minn. Stat. § 336.2-725(1) provides: “An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.” That section also states: “This section does not apply to claims against sellers of goods for damages to property caused by the goods where the property that is damaged is not the goods and the sale is not a sale between parties who are each merchants in goods of the kind.” Check the current text of § 541.05 and § 336.2-725 before relying on these periods. My page on Minnesota statutes of limitations for business claims lists more claim types.

A claim that rests on another state’s law can carry that state’s period. Minn. Stat. § 541.31, subd. 1 provides that if a claim is substantively based “(1) upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies.” If it is based “(2) upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this state applies.” For everything else, “(b) The limitation period of this state applies to all other claims.” When another state’s period applies, Minn. Stat. § 541.32 carries over that state’s accrual and tolling rules too: “If the statute of limitations of another state applies to the assertion of a claim in this state, the other state’s relevant statutes and other rules of law governing tolling and accrual apply in computing the limitation period, but its statutes and other rules of law governing conflict of laws do not apply.” Under Minn. Stat. § 541.33, when the other state’s period “is substantially different from the limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden in defending against, the claim, the limitation period of this state applies.” Subdivision 2 of § 541.31 adds a rule for a Minnesota plaintiff: “If a cause of action arises outside of this state and the action is barred under the applicable statute of limitations of the place where it arose, the action may be maintained in this state if the plaintiff is a resident of this state who has owned the cause of action since it accrued and the cause of action is not barred under the applicable statute of limitations of this state.”

When Does the Clock Start on a Claim Against a Business?

Minnesota generally starts the clock when the claim could first have been brought, which can be well before the plaintiff learned of it. The statutes for fraud and for injury claims over construction defects, and a goods warranty that extends to future performance, tie the start to discovery instead. In Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “A cause of action accrues when all of the elements of the action have occurred, such that the cause of action could be brought and would survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”

Not knowing about the claim generally does not delay that date. In Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1999), a construction company and its owner sued their former law firm over advice on transactions that began in 1987. The court wrote: “Thus, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, the running of the statute is not tolled by ignorance of the cause of action.” It added: “We have declined to adopt the discovery rule in the past,” and held the claim, commenced in 1996, time barred. My page on the discovery rule covers that doctrine in more depth.

For contracts, a central question is whether there was one breach or a series. In Park Nicollet, the parties agreed that § 541.07(5) governed, a period the court applies whenever “the gravamen of the action is the breach of an employment contract.” A physician’s claim under his employer’s policy accrued when the employer refused to perform on his demand, and later pay reductions were consequences of that single breach. The court wrote that the employee’s late appreciation of the breach’s effects “does not postpone the accrual of his cause of action based on that breach.” It distinguished an earlier decision involving commissions owed each year, describing that case this way: “Each failure to pay commissions therefore constituted a new cause of action from which the statute of limitations would run.” A claim built on repeated payment obligations can therefore be timely for later installments even when earlier ones are too old. The court also wrote that “Failure to perform under a contract when performance is due establishes an immediate breach,” and, citing an earlier decision, that where a party “does nothing more than declare . . . an intention not to comply with its terms prior to the time the declarant must perform, . . . the statute of limitations does not begin to run.”

Some statutes start the clock differently:

  1. Fraud: under § 541.05, subd. 1(6), a fraud claim does not accrue “until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” In Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2002), the Minnesota Supreme Court described a fraud claim as accruing when “the party knew or reasonably should have known that he or she was harmed by another’s conduct.”
  2. Sales of goods within § 336.2-725: § 336.2-725(2) provides: “A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.” It adds: “A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.”
  3. Construction defects: under Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subdivision 1(c), an injury claim under paragraph (a) accrues “upon discovery of the injury.” Under subdivision 1(a), “Except where fraud is involved,” no such claim may “accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction.” A contribution or indemnity claim has its own accrual rule in subdivision 1(c), quoted in the next section’s list of limits. Check the current text of § 541.051 before relying on that period.

What Are the Rules for Claims Over Finished Construction Work?

A customer’s claim over the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property follows § 541.051, which can bar the claim even if the customer only recently found the defect. Subdivision 1(a) reaches claims “in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.” It protects anyone “performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property” and also “the owner of the real property.” Except where fraud is involved, it bars such an action brought “more than two years after the cause of action accrues, as specified in paragraph (c), nor in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction.” Check the current text of § 541.051 before relying on these periods.

Two clocks run under these rules. The first starts at discovery: under subdivision 1(c), a property-damage claim accrues “(2) for an action for injury to real or personal property, upon discovery of the injury, but in no event does a cause of action accrue earlier than substantial completion, termination, or abandonment of the construction or the improvement to real property.” The second is the outer limit measured from substantial completion: “Date of substantial completion shall be determined by the date when construction is sufficiently completed so that the owner or the owner’s representative can occupy or use the improvement for the intended purpose.”

For a claim that accrues late in that span, subdivision 2 provides that, for a cause of action “which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after substantial completion of the construction, an action to recover damages may be brought within two years after the date on which the cause of action accrued, but in no event may such an action be brought more than 12 years after substantial completion of the construction.” Check the current text of § 541.051, subd. 2 before relying on that period.

Several limits narrow the statute’s protection:

  1. Fraud: the bar in subdivision 1(a) applies “Except where fraud is involved.”
  2. Written warranties: subdivision 4 provides: “For the purposes of actions based on breach of the statutory warranties set forth in section 327A.02, or to actions based on breach of an express written warranty, such actions shall be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach.” For home-warranty claims under section 327A.05, subdivision 4 adds: “In the case of an action under section 327A.05, which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after the warranty date, as defined in section 327A.01, subdivision 8, an action may be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach, but in no event may an action under section 327A.05 be brought more than 12 years after the effective warranty date.” Check the current text of § 541.051, subd. 4 before relying on that period.
  3. Equipment: subdivision 1(e) states: “The limitations prescribed in this section do not apply to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery installed upon real property.”
  4. Property owners: subdivision 1(d) provides: “Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of the real property improvement against the owner or other person in possession.”
  5. Contractor claims against others, such as a general contractor’s claim against a subcontractor: subdivision 1(b) provides: “Notwithstanding paragraph (a), an action for contribution or indemnity arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought no later than two years after the cause of action for contribution or indemnity has accrued, regardless of whether it accrued before or after the ten-year period referenced in paragraph (a), provided that in no event may an action for contribution or indemnity be brought more than 14 years after substantial completion of the construction.” Under subdivision 1(c), that claim “accrues upon the earlier of commencement of the action against the party seeking contribution or indemnity, or payment of a final judgment, arbitration award, or settlement arising out of the defective and unsafe condition.” Check the current text of § 541.051, subd. 1 before relying on these periods.

Two more rules apply to a home builder or home improvement contractor. Minn. Stat. § 327A.02, subd. 4(b) provides: “The applicable statute of limitations and statute of repose for an action based on breach of a warranty imposed by this section, or any other action in contract, tort, or other law for any injury to real or personal property or bodily injury or wrongful death arising out of the alleged loss or damage, is tolled from the date the written notice provided by the vendee or owner is postmarked, or if not sent through the mail, received by the vendor or home improvement contractor until the latest of the following,” which are “(1) the date of completion of the home warranty dispute resolution process under section 327A.051” or “(2) 180 days.” Minn. Stat. § 327A.03 also limits the statutory warranty: “The liability of the vendor or the home improvement contractor under sections 327A.01 to 327A.07 . . . does not extend to the following: (a) loss or damage not reported by the vendee or the owner to the vendor or the home improvement contractor in writing within six months after the vendee or the owner discovers or should have discovered the loss or damage; unless the vendee or owner establishes that the vendor or home improvement contractor had actual notice of the loss or damage.” Check the current text of § 327A.02 and § 327A.03 before relying on these periods.

Goods that go into a building follow this statute too. § 336.2-725 states: “The limitations in this section do not apply to actions for the breach of any contract for sale of a grain storage structure or other goods that are incorporated into an improvement to real property, except equipment and machinery. These actions are subject only to the statute of limitations set forth in section 541.051.”

How Can the Deadline Be Paused or Extended?

Several rules can stop the clock, so a claim that looks old on the calendar may still be timely. I suggest checking each of these against your facts before relying on the defense, because several turn on facts outside the complaint, such as where the defendant was or what the plaintiff could have discovered:

  1. Fraudulent concealment. In Williamson v. Prasciunas, 661 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. App. 2003), the court quoted an earlier decision: “To establish fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove there was an affirmative act or statement which concealed a potential cause of action,” that the statement “was known to be false,” and that reasonable diligence could not have uncovered the concealment. The court also wrote: “Mere suspicion, in a case of fraudulent concealment, is not sufficient to stop the tolling of the statute of limitations.” My page on how concealment pauses the limitations clock covers the elements.
  2. A defendant outside Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 541.13 provides that “if, after a cause of action accrues, the person departs from and resides out of the state and while out of the state is not subject to process under the laws of this state or after diligent search the person cannot be found for the purpose of personal service when personal service is required, the time of the person’s absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.” For a claim that accrues against a person already out of the state under the same conditions, “an action may be commenced within the times herein limited after the person’s return to the state.” Both clauses apply only when the defendant was not subject to Minnesota process or could not be found.
  3. A plaintiff’s disability or a court order. Minn. Stat. § 541.15(a) provides that, “Except as provided in paragraph (b),” listed disabilities “shall suspend the running of the period of limitation until the same is removed.” The list includes “(1) that the plaintiff is within the age of 18 years,” “(2) the plaintiff’s insanity,” and “(4) when the beginning of the action is stayed by injunction or by statutory prohibition.” The same paragraph states: “If two or more disabilities shall coexist, the suspension shall continue until all are removed.” It also limits the extension: “provided that such period, except in the case of infancy, shall not be extended for more than five years, nor in any case for more than one year after the disability ceases.” Paragraph (b) sets a different rule for claims against a health care provider: “In actions alleging malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, against a health care provider, the ground of disability specified in paragraph (a), clause (1), suspends the period of limitation until the disability is removed. The suspension may not be extended for more than seven years, or for more than one year after the disability ceases.” Check the current text of § 541.15 before relying on these periods.
  4. Equitable tolling. In State v. Madison Equities, Inc., 29 N.W.3d 700 (Minn. 2026), the Minnesota Supreme Court, quoting an earlier decision, wrote that the standard it applies to toll a statute of limitations “is necessarily a high one.” It also stated that “the statute of limitations will not run against a plaintiff in a few exceptional circumstances.” It held that litigation over an Attorney General’s civil investigative demand tolled the period for the Attorney General’s later enforcement action, and it described that holding as applying narrowly to that setting.
  5. A tolling agreement. Parties can agree to pause the clock while they investigate or negotiate, and the section on reviving or keeping alive an old claim explains what that costs the business. My page on drafting a tolling agreement covers the terms.

For sales of goods, § 336.2-725(4) states: “This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations,” so these pausing rules can reach a goods claim too.

When Does a Contract Clause Shorten the Deadline?

A contract clause can shorten the time to sue if no statute forbids it and the period is reasonable on the facts. In Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2002), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: “Parties may limit the time within which legal claims may be brought provided there is no statute specifically prohibiting the use of a different limitations period in such a case and the time fixed is not unreasonable.” Reasonableness “depends upon the particular facts presented.”

The case shows where a clause can fail. A home seller’s arbitration agreement required claims within a fixed period after closing, and the buyers found the hidden water damage only later. The court held that the period, as applied to the buyers’ fraud claim, was “not within the bounds of reasonableness.” It explained that “there is a difference between merely shortening the time within which an existing claim may be brought and altering the date on which a cause of action accrues.” In a footnote, the court called its decision “fact-specific,” so a clause that runs from a date before the other side could know of the claim deserves the closest look.

For a contract to sell goods, the UCC answers part of the question directly. § 336.2-725(1) provides: “By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.” Check the current text of § 336.2-725(1) before relying on that period.

How Can an Old Claim Be Revived or Kept Alive?

For a claim under chapter 541, an acknowledgment or promise to pay an old debt counts toward reviving it only if it is in a writing the business signed. Minn. Stat. § 541.17 provides: “No acknowledgment or promise shall be evidence of a new or continuing contract sufficient to take the case out of the operation of this chapter unless the same is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this section shall not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest.” A signed letter acknowledging an old balance, or a signed promise to pay it, can therefore matter, and the section leaves the effect of a payment in place.

A tolling agreement keeps a claim alive by design. In Minnesota Landmarks v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 466 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. App. 1991), a general contractor had signed a standstill agreement with the building owner over defective skylights. The court held that the contractor did not “have” a limitations defense “because it had signed the standstill agreement and had not yet lifted the tolling of the statute.” The subcontractor and the glass supplier therefore could not use that defense against the owner’s claim to defeat the contractor’s claims against them.

An amended complaint can also reach back in time. Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 provides: “Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” A new claim added late in a timely case, if it arose from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, can therefore be measured from the original complaint’s date. An amendment that names a new defendant must meet more conditions: “An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against that party.”

How Does a Business Raise the Statute of Limitations Defense?

The business must raise the defense itself, in its answer and, when the complaint shows the dates, by a motion that can come before the answer. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 provides: “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction,” and the list of defenses that follows includes “statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” My page on what an answer must contain covers the rest of that document.

Leaving it out has a cost. In Rehberger v. Project Plumbing Co., 205 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1973), a plumbing contractor argued on appeal that a customer’s claim was too old. The Minnesota Supreme Court wrote: “A failure to plead an affirmative defense, without later amendment of the pleading, waives the defense.” The court noted that the contractor “failed to specifically raise the limitation defense in its answer, and the issue was not decided by the lower court.” It declined to consider the defense on appeal because the trial court had not passed on it, which it called “especially true” where “the facts upon which its application depends are in dispute.” A missed defense can sometimes be added. Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 provides: “A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it no later than 21 days after it is served.” Otherwise, a party may amend “only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Check the current text of Rule 15.01 before relying on that period.

The defense can be pressed in two ways:

  1. A motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 for “(e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” That defense “may at the option of the pleader be made by motion,” and “A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.” After the answer, Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” In Hansen v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 934 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 2019), the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed a limitations dismissal under Rule 12.02(e) and, quoting an earlier decision, wrote that “the party asserting the defense has the burden of establishing each of the elements.” It added: “In that context, a motion to dismiss should be granted only when it is clear from the stated allegations in the complaint that the statute of limitations has run.” The court reinstated the complaint there because its allegations did not show the claim accrued too early. When the complaint itself shows the claim is late, as in Park Nicollet, dismissal can come at the start. If records outside the complaint are presented and not excluded, Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 provides that “the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”
  2. Summary judgment, where the dates come from records. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 provides: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Herrmann was decided this way, on undisputed facts about when the first transaction occurred.

What Are a Business’s Options When an Old Claim Is Threatened?

A business facing an old claim has more choices than a court filing, and each depends on dates it can prove. These are the main paths, with when each fits:

  1. The first step is gathering the dates. The contract signing, the delivery or completion date, the last payment, any signed acknowledgment, and the date of service decide the analysis in each section above. Records showing those dates support every path below.
  2. A written answer to the demand can name the defense. When the dates are clear, that reply can end the matter. The risk is a signed statement that acknowledges the debt under § 541.17, so I suggest keeping any such statement out of the reply. My page on how to respond to a demand letter covers that reply.
  3. A direct conversation, owner to owner, can resolve the claim. This fits when the relationship with the customer or vendor matters more than the claim, and it can settle the matter without lawyers on either side. The same § 541.17 caution applies to anything signed during those talks. That section also “shall not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest,” so I suggest checking any partial payment offered in those talks the same way, because the section leaves a payment’s effect in place. What the business says in those talks can also cost it the defense. In Brenner v. Nordby, 306 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that estoppel’s “elements are representations or inducements by the defendant upon which the plaintiff has reasonably relied to his detriment.” The court reversed a summary judgment on limitations and sent estoppel to a factfinder, where the plaintiff’s attorney said the defendant had not denied liability and had described an investigation that might lead to settlement.
  4. A tolling agreement can buy time. This fits when both sides want time to investigate or settle, and Minnesota Landmarks shows the business does not have the defense while it runs.
  5. In a lawsuit, a Rule 12.02 motion can raise the defense before the answer, and Rule 8.03 requires it in the answer. The choice among a motion before the answer, a Rule 12.03 motion for judgment on the pleadings after it, and summary judgment turns on whether the complaint itself shows the dates. My page on the first weeks after your business is served covers the deadlines that start at service.
Is it too late for a customer to sue over a job we finished seven years ago?

Possibly: absent fraud, Minn. Stat. § 541.051 bars actions over “the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property” brought “more than two years after the cause of action accrues.” A property claim accrues “upon discovery of the injury” but cannot “accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction.” Statutory and express written warranty actions must “be brought within two years of the discovery of the breach” (subdivision 4). Written notice to a home vendor or home improvement contractor tolls these periods (§ 327A.02, subd. 4(b)). Check the current text before relying on these periods.

Does the clock start when the customer only just found the problem?

It generally does not, absent a statute or concealment. Herrmann (Minn. 1999), a malpractice case, declined to adopt the discovery rule. Minn. Stat. § 336.2-725(2) starts covered goods claims at the breach, even if unknown, except some future-performance warranties. For a construction defect, the answer turns on whether the claim is an injury claim under § 541.051, subd. 1(a), or a contribution or indemnity claim under subd. 1(b). The construction section quotes both rules. Under Peggy Rose (Minn. 2002), fraud accrues when “the party knew or reasonably should have known that he or she was harmed by another’s conduct.”

Will a claims-period clause in our contract hold up?

It can. In Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, 640 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2002), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that parties may shorten the time to sue if no statute specifically prohibits a different period. The time fixed must also not be unreasonable, which depends on the facts. The court refused to enforce a short clause against a fraud claim over hidden water damage. For a sale of goods, Minn. Stat. § 336.2-725(1) allows the original agreement to “reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.” Check the current text of § 336.2-725 before relying on that period.

Should we sign a tolling agreement the other side sent us?

That is your business decision, and it gives something up. In Minnesota Landmarks v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 466 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. App. 1991), a contractor that signed a standstill agreement did not have a limitations defense while the agreement was in effect. The court also noted that such agreements give parties time to measure exposure and settle without litigation. I suggest reading how the agreement ends and which claims it covers before signing, because those terms decide when your defense returns.

Can a letter acknowledging an old balance revive the claim?

An unsigned one cannot, for a claim under Minnesota’s limitations chapter. Minn. Stat. § 541.17 provides that no acknowledgment or promise is evidence of a new or continuing contract sufficient to take a case out of the limitations chapter “unless the same is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby.” The same section “shall not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest.” Before your business signs anything about an old balance or makes a payment on it, I suggest checking how it affects the timing, because this section addresses both.

What if our answer left out the statute of limitations?

The defense may be lost unless the answer is amended. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 requires the statute of limitations to be set forth affirmatively in the responsive pleading. In Rehberger v. Project Plumbing Co., 205 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1973), the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that a failure to plead an affirmative defense, without later amendment of the pleading, waives it. Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 allows amendment once as a matter of course in some cases, by written consent of the adverse party, or by leave of court, which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Does a demand letter stop the limitations clock?

No. Under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01, commencement occurs on service, a signed service waiver, or “when the summons is delivered for service to the sheriff in the county where the defendant resides,” but delivery “shall be ineffectual unless within 60 days thereafter the summons is actually served on that defendant or the first publication thereof is made.” Check the current text before relying on that period. Absent a tolling agreement or other pausing rule, letters do not stop the clock, though statements the claimant reasonably relied on in delaying suit can estop a business (Brenner v. Nordby, Minn. 1981).

The Statute of Limitations Defense in Practice

The statute of limitations defense turns on three dates: when the claim accrued, which period applies, and when the action was commenced against the business. Under Rule 3.01, commencement includes service or a signed waiver; for a Fair Labor Standards Act claim, 29 U.S.C. § 256 uses the complaint’s filing date or a later consent’s filing date. Unless a statute or the defendant’s concealment provides otherwise, Minnesota courts start the clock when the claim could first be brought, not when the plaintiff learned of it. Rules including fraud, concealment, a defendant’s absence from the state, a plaintiff’s disability, equitable tolling, the construction and warranty rules, contract clauses, and signed agreements can change that answer. The defense is waived if the business does not plead it and does not later amend. My business litigation page describes how I handle these cases. To learn whether a claim against your business is too old, email [email protected] with a brief description, and I can start an intake and conflict check before you send any confidential documents.